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A Computer with a View
PROGRESS, PRIVACY, AND GOOGLE
INTRODUCTION
[Tihe existing law affords a principle which may be invoked to protect the
privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the
photographer .... [or] any other modern device for recording or reproducing
scenes ....
[Is it the case that] any individual, by appearing upon the public highway, or in
any other public place, makes his appearance public, so that any one may take
and publish a picture of him as he is at the time[?] What if an utterly obscure
citizen, reeling along drunk on the main street, is snapped by an enterprising
reporter, and the picture given to the world? Is his privacy invaded?
2
The authors of the quotations above, Samuel Warren, Louis
Brandeis, and William Prosser, were not referring to the Internet when
they described the increasing invasion of modem devices into personal
privacy, but their words are still poignant for many citizens of a world in
which novel technology seems to sprout silently, rapidly, and endlessly.
The generation gap has reappeared in digital form, between the youth
culture's acceptance of camera phones, email, Internet video, online chat
rooms, and computerized socializing and analog-loving parents. One area
of great concern to the older generations is personal privacy, which many
note has been threatened (if not eviscerated) by the recent proliferation of
private surveillance technologies and the Internet's capability to provide
unlimited access to that information.3 Much scholarship on surveillance
technology and the Internet focuses on the frightening aspects of the
phenomenon and its dystopic effects, culminating in a call to establish
new legislation to prevent invasions of individual privacy,4 to modify tort
I Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
206 (1890).
2 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 394 (1960).
3 See, e.g., James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections
to Keep Pace With Technology, 902 PLI/PAT 407, 411-12 (2007); Clifford S. Fishman, Technology
and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers,
Corporations, and the Media, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1503, 1505-07 (2004); Elbert Lin,
Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 1085,
1091-92 (2002).
4 See, e.g., Camrin L. Crisci, Note, All the World Is Not a Stage: Finding a Right to
Privacy in Existing and Proposed Legislation, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 207, 239-43 (2002);
Clay Calvert & Justin Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms
In Cyberspace, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 469, 500 (2000); Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 755-57 (1999).
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law to bring anticipated harms to privacy within reach,5 or to enshrine a
new right of privacy into the Constitution or state law.6 These solutions,
however, are sometimes problematic because they often assume that
people value personal privacy homogenously.7 This assumption proves
increasingly false in a world where some people enjoy broadcasting their
entire lives through an Internet web camera and others relish the
opportunity to publish embarrassing photographs of themselves on the
World Wide Web.'
Protection against invasions of privacy may be formal or
physical.' Formal protections are those value- or standards-based social
conventions that tell us, for example, not to stare at disabled people and
to expect to vote by secret ballot."0 Physical protections are the logistical
obstacles that prevent society from gathering information about an
individual, such as locked doors or password-protected hard drives."
Notions of what types or levels of privacy should be expected by
reasonable people depend on both the goals of the formal protections and
the possibilities of the physical protections. 2 New technologies do not
necessarily reshape this basic interdependence. They either weaken or
bolster the pre-existing physical protections such that we must reexamine
the social support and desire for the formal ones to maintain the status quo.
This Note contends that the advent of Google Street View, a
web-based surveillance application, provides an excellent vantage point
from which to evaluate the formal and physical protections of legal
privacy in the United States. The technology behind Street View has long
been regarded by legal academics, social scientists, and philosophers as
synonymous with unchecked power and coercion, yet the strong public
5 See, e.g., Joseph Siprut, Privacy Through Anonymity: An Economic Argument for
Expanding the Right of Privacy in Public Places, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 311, 322-33 (2006); Andrew Jay
McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in
Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 991-92 (1995).
6 See, e.g., Matthew C. Keck, Cookies, the Constitution, and the Common Law: A
Framework for the Right of Privacy on the Internet, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 83, 95 (2002); Lin,
supra note 3, at 1107-18.
7 Anita L. Allen is a notable exception to this generalization. Her work discusses exactly
this wide divergence in privacy valuations, and suggests forcing privacy on certain populations to
protect them. Allen, supra note 4, at 728-29.
8 See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. For instance, experts currently estimate
that over 100 million people maintain personal web pages on social networking sites where
everything and anything can be published. Robert Sprague, Googling Job Applicants: Incorporating
Personal Information into Hiring Decisions, 23 THE LABOR LAWYER 19, 19 (2007).
Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the
Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 43 (1995) ("[P]rivacy can be protected in two ways.... the formal conditions of
privacy and the material conditions.").
10 Id. at 43.
1 Id. at 43.
12 For a fuller explanation of the formal/material dichotomy in privacy protection, see
Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values With Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH. 288, 315-16
(2001). Anthropologists have also concluded that "privacy is minimal where technology and social
organization are minimal." DECKLE MCLEAN, PRIVACY AND ITS INVASION 1 (Praeger 1995).
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backlash that scholarship predicted has not occurred yet in America. 3
Thus, Street View represents a unique watershed moment in modem
American privacy discourse because it has spurred only a single lawsuit
and mild public protest, yet the technology it represents is the subject of
hundreds of pages of legal commentary. 4 Could it be that the digital
generation gap operates in conjunction with another ideological gap
already at work? If so, how should that gap be addressed or integrated
into privacy law's current schema?
Part I of this Note provides a background of Street View's
inception and technology, and explains why it is the ideal event through
which to unearth how American society protects personal privacy. Part I
concludes by arguing that both the growing population that lives a large
part of life online and the development of industries dedicated to policing
online reputations demonstrate an understanding that online image
management is a crucial aspect of how people present themselves to the
modem world. Part II of this Note explores the strengths and weaknesses
of a privacy tort claim against Street View and Google's available
defenses to such a claim. Part III will pick up the notion of online image
management expounded in Part I, and will suggest that this concept
forms the nucleus of a new branch of privacy that is already recognized
by most Internet users. This Note will conclude by suggesting several
legal and economic reforms that could be implemented if we determine as a
society that the privacy values laid bare by Street View should be protected.
I. STREET VIEW: WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE SHOULD CARE
Street View is an application embedded in Google's standard
map platform that allows the user to view images of selected street
faqades as if he or she was literally standing on the street of the target
address. 5 Despite its very recent origins, Street View has become one of
13 Canada, by contrast, is debating whether Street View invades individuals' privacy on a
national level. Mathew Ingram, Google: We Hear (and See a Fuzzy Rendition of You), Canada,
GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 24, 2007. European privacy law may pose hurdles to Street View's arrival
there as well. Struan Robertson, Google's Street View Could Be Unlawful in Europe, OUT-
LAW.COM, May 6, 2007, http://www.out-law.com/page-8116. In response, Google will alter Street
View images taken in Europe to blur out or block faces and license plates. Robert McMillan, Google
Making Street View Anonymous, PCWORLD.COM, Nov. 30, 2007, http://pcworld.comarticle/id,
140164-pg,l/article/html. Google's plans for a version of Street View in the United Kingdom have
been questioned by the government's Information Commissioner and met with demands for privacy
guarantees. David Derbyshire & Arthur Martin, Google Spies at Your Door: Privacy Row as Web
Giant Starts Sending Cameras Down Every Street, DAILY MAIL, July 11, 2008. The lone legal
complaint filed against Google Street View has come from the United States and is discussed in Part
n.A and infra note 116.
14 Ironically, Google itself is attempting to lead the discussion on appropriate
international online privacy standards. Ingram, supra note 13. International concerns about Google's
storage of users' web search data has provoked the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the
European Union to look into Internet privacy issues in the coming months. Id.
15 Posting of Stephen Chau to Google Lat Long Blog, http://google-latlong.
blogspot.com/2007/05/introducing-street-view.html (May 29, 2007, 10:11 EST).
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Google's most popular and most critiqued features.16 Street View's scope
continues to expand; since its introduction, it has grown to include over
170 cities and their surrounding areas across the United States.17 Street
View represents both the best and the worst of the role that online images
play in modem society. On the one hand, there is significant potential for
images of Street View's ilk-pictures taken in public of unaware
subjects-to wreak havoc on an unwitting subject's life, and this
potential has already been realized in some cases. 8 Yet on the other
hand, Street View's generally warm acceptance by the public signals a
new understanding of privacy, one in which people expect and
apparently approve of being surveyed by a benign private actor. 9 Thus,
regardless of what one thinks of its appropriateness or utility, Street View
is a key development in privacy law that warrants a new accounting of why
we protect privacy in the first place, and how violations of privacy caused by
novel technologies should be treated under the law.
A. Development, Scope, and Public Response
Google's product manager announced the arrival of Street View
on May 29, 2007, describing it as a vehicle to "further enhance [users']
ability to understand the world through images... by viewing and navigating
within 360-degree scenes of street-level imagery."'2 Initially available in
only five U.S. cities, Street View has since grown to cover the downtown
areas of over 170 U.S. cities in approximately sixteen months.2' Google
has also launched Street View in France, Italy, Spain, Australia, and
Japan.22
Street View works by allowing the user to click on an intersection
of the online Google map, which opens a smaller window showing composite
digital images of the street faqade of that intersection.23 The images on
Street View are gathered by a fleet of automobiles that Google deploys
16 The web post through which Google first announced its launch of the Street View
application was one of Google's five most-often read posts in 2007, and the phrase "street view" was
one of the year's most popular keyword searches. Posting of Carter Maslan to Google Lat Long
Blog, http://google-latlong.blogpost.com/2007/12/best-of-blog.html (Dec. 23, 2007, 18:20 EST).
17 Google Maps, http://maps.google.com/ (click "Street View" button and click on map;
move map around to see where Street View is available) (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
18 See infra Part I.B.
19 See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
20 Chau, supra note 15.
21 Google Maps, supra note 17. To date, only one U.S. city, North Paul, Minnesota, has
not allowed Street View to film its streets, and Google complied. Lora Pabst, North Oaks Tells
Google Maps: Keep Out - We Mean It, STARTRIBUNE.COM, May 31, 2008,
http://www.startribune.com/lifestyle/19416279.htm.
22 Google Maps, supra note 17.
23 Brady Forrest, Where 2.0: Google Launches Streetside View with Tech from
ImmersiveMedia (May 29, 2007), http://radar.oreilly.com/2007/05/where-20-google-launches-
stree.html.
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with varying regularity24 on the streets of target cities, each equipped
with a special 360-degree camera that snaps pictures at specified
intervals. 25 The cameras produce overlapping pictures that are blended
together to create the impression of a seamless panoramic view of a
street.26 Navigational arrow buttons let the user "walk" down a street in a
particular direction and rotate the view of the camera window, giving the
user the sense of turning around 360 degrees on the street.27 Vertical
viewing (both down and up) is now available in all Street View cities,28
and Google has augmented the Street View options for its most recently
added cities by including a vertical zoom that allows users to pan up the
faqades of fifty-story skyscrapers.29 Image quality also varies by city; for
example, San Francisco, San Diego, Phoenix, Tucson, and parts of
Chicago were filmed in high resolution, giving the user increased zooming
without sacrificing image clarity.3" As a result, even faces, fine print on
fence signs,3 and products on a shelf inside a store32 are clearly visible.
Google's rollout of Street View is the latest escalation in the
Internet "mapping war," in which Internet behemoths such as Microsoft,
Google, Yahoo!, and MapQuest have engaged for the last few years.33
According to one industry market analyst, the fight for digital mapping
supremacy has transformed online mapping into "a microcosm of the
search space, with the major companies competing for users and
24 Although the images on Street View are not currently live, Google executives have
expressed interest in adding live video feeds to the application in the future. Thomas Claburn,
Google Adds Street-Level Pictures to Google Maps, INFORMATIONWEEK.COM (May 29, 2007),
http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD =199703115.
25 Charlie White, Google Streetview Camera Car Fleet Set to Invade America (July 17,
2007), http://gizmodo.com/gadgets/eye-on-you/google-streetview-camera-car-fleet-set-to-invade-
america-279222.php. See also Daniel Terdiman, The Camera Behind Google's Street View, CNET
NEWS.COM, May 31, 2007, http://news.com/8301-10784_3-9724604-7.html. Google apparently used
its own proprietary technology to create the highest resolution pictures of the San Francisco Bay
area. Id.
26 Elinor Mills, Google Now Zaps Faces, License Plates on Map Street View, CNET
NEWS.cOM, Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301 -10784_3-9764512-7.html.
27 See Forrest, supra note 23 (showing screen shot of the Street View interface and
directional buttons).
28 Posting of Jiajun Zhu to Google Lat Long Blog, http://google-
latlong.blogspot.com/2008/06/street-view-tums-l-keeps-on-growing.html (June 10, 2008, 9:57
EST).
29 Posting of Stephane Lafon to Google Lat Long Blog, http://google-
latlong.blogspot.com/2007/10/more-street-view-cities-to-explore.html (Oct. 9, 2007, 5:46 EST).
3 See Posting of Stephen Chau to Google Lat Long Blog, http://google-
latlong.blogspot.comI2007/08/more-street-view-cities.html (Aug. 7, 2007, 6:13 EST); Lafon, supra
note 29.
31 Google Street View Gallery, http://streetviewgallery.corank.com/tech/framed/great-
Google-Street-View-Resolution (click on Street View character) (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
32 Post, High Res Google Street View, http://streetviewgallery.corank.comltechlframedl
high-Res-Google-Street-View (click on Street View icon and zoom in to closest level) (last visited
Sept. 5, 2008).
33 Elise Ackerman, Search Giants Battle over Mapping, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
May 29, 2007; see also Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 2321, 2335-
36 (2007) (detailing the acquisition of mapping software by various search engine companies).
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innovation ... ." Given that Microsoft has offered a comparable web
application, "Street-Side," since February 2006,31 and Amazon.com
supported static images of streets in twenty-two cities in its now-defunct
search service, "A9," for a year and a half,36 Google's addition of Street
View might not have attracted much attention outside the industry were
it not for a tabby cat.
The day after Street View's launch, an Oakland resident, Mary
Kalin-Casey, entered her own home street address into the program, and
was more than surprised to recognize her tabby cat lounging on a perch
near the window of her second-story apartment in the image associated
with her street corner.37 While Casey supported online mapping in
general, Street View "literally g[ave] [her] the shakes" because she felt it
had invaded her privacy to some degree.38 Responses to Kalin-Casey's
complaint ranged from sympathetic and supportive, to those who labeled
her insane, paranoid, or a "deluded cat fancier."39 Kalin-Casey's story
was quickly picked up by the New York Times the next day and
Slate.com within a week.' The fight over Street View's purported
invasions of privacy had begun.
Kevin Bankston is another prominent voice in the debate over
whether Street View's images invade the privacy of their subjects.
Bankston, a staff attorney at an Internet privacy advocacy group, was
caught on camera a few years ago by Amazon.com's obsolete A9
mapping platform while smoking a cigarette outside his office-a habit
he had been successfully hiding from his family for some time.4' After
A9's demise, Bankston might have thought his days in front of the
camera were over, but ironically Street View caught him again, this time
on a walk to work.42 Bankston was one of the first to test Street View's
34 Ackerman, supra note 33 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Greg Sterling of Sterling
Market Intelligence). In 2007, Google also introduced images of the night sky (capable of zooming
in on constellations, our galaxy's planets, the moon, and individual stars) into its downloadable map
platform, Google Earth, complete with imagery integrated from the Hubble Space Telescope.
Google Press Center, Introducing Sky in Google Earth: New Feature in Google Earth Enables Users
to Explore Space from Their Computer (Aug. 22, 2007), http://www.google.com/intl/
en/press/pressrel/earthsky_.20070822.html.
3 Michael Arrington, Killer New Live.com Service: Street-Side, TechCruch.com (Feb.
28, 2006), http://www.techcrunch.com/2006/02/28/killer-new-livecom-service-street-side/.
36 Clabum, supra note 24 (describing A9 features). Amazon removed the street-level
pictures from A9 as part of the rollback of its "flashy search engine" project in October 2006,
roughly 18 months after its launch in January 2005. Seattle24X7.com, What's Brewing: A-9 R-I-P!,
(Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.seattle24x7.combrewing/brewingl00906.htm.
37 Miguel Helft, Google Zooms In Too Close for Some, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at C1.
38 Xeni Jardin, Google Maps is Spying on My Cat, Says Freaked out BB Reader,
BoingBoin.net (May 30, 2007), http://boingboing.net/2007/05/30/google-maps-is-spyin.html.
T Id.
40 Helft, supra note 37; Michael Agger, Google Spy, SLATE, June 8, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2168127/fr/rss/.
41 Elinor Mills, Cameras Everywhere, Even in Online Maps, CNET NEWS.COM, May 30,
2007, httpJ/www.news.conr/Cameras-everywhere,-even-in-online-naps/2100-1038-3-687556.hutl; see
also Helft, supra note 37.
42 Posting of Kevin Poulsen to Wired Blog Network, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/
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procedure for requesting removal of an image and was shocked to find it
was arguably more invasive than being caught on Street View itself. 3
Google's removal procedure requirements demanded that a user submit
his legal name, email address, a sworn statement, and a copy of a valid
photo ID in order to secure "temporary" removal of an image. 4'
Thanks to the fast-moving blog community, Bankston's outrage
was not in vain. Bankston provided the website Wired.com with the
letter he received from Google detailing its removal requirements, and
within a few hours after Wired.com posted a piece on Bankston's story,
Google "blinked."45 The company's product counselor telephoned
Bankston to tell him that Google had officially changed its Street View
removal policy, which now asks users only for their names and the
location of the disputed image in Street View, and even promises not to
use that information for any other purpose.46 Google's policy also now
provides for the removal of a person's face or license plate number upon
request.47
Street View has unquestionably become a powerful player in the
online mapping war since its introduction in May 2007. As some
individuals have already discovered, being captured by Street View can
lead to personal unrest and plenty of unwanted Internet fame.48
Nonetheless, by continually expanding the number of cities it covers,
increasing its image resolution capacity, and adding sophisticated
vertical pan/zoom features, the application's popularity will surely only
increase in the future.49 Therefore, the effects of Street View's scope
2007/06/effprivacy-adv.html (June 11, 2007, 12:41 EST).
4 Posting of Kevin Poulsen to Wired Blog Network, http://blog.wired.coni/27bstroke6/
2007/06/want off street.html (June 15, 2007, 2:42 EST) ("Apparently you have to jump through
more hoops than a trained seal .... Of course, if the choice is giving Google a copy of my driver's
license or leaving the picture up, I'll take the latter .... It's worth noting that there's no apparent
policy limiting Google's use of the information I'm being asked to provide them") (quotation marks
omitted) (2uoting Kevin Bankson).
Id. (reprinting Google's letter to Bankston in response to his removal request).
45 Id.
46 Id.; Google Maps: Report Inappropriate Image, http://maps.google.com, (locate a
Street View image, click "Street View Help," click "Report Inappropriate image") (last visited Sept.
5, 2008). The actual removal request submission form provides the following choices as reasons for
flagging a particular image: (1) "This image contains inappropriate content"; (2) "This image
infringes on my privacy"; (3) "This image present personal security concerns"; and (4) "Other
(please describe below)." Id.
47 Mills, supra note 26. However, as discussed infra in Part I.B, post-hoc removal of a
Street View image solves only a very small portion of the problems it may have caused.
48 See infra Part I.B.
49 For example, teenagers in the United Kingdom are already using Google Earth (into
which Street View is embedded) to locate houses with insecure swimming pools to arrange mass
"dipping" events, leaving pool owners enraged. Luke Salkeld, The Google Earth Gatecrashers Who
Take Uninvited Dips in Home-owners' Swimming Pools, THE DAILY MAIL, June 18, 2008. Home
owners have woken up to find strangers in their pools or have come home to find their pools full of
empty beer cans. Id.
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have practical and theoretical consequences for privacy law that must be
considered."
B. Practical and Theoretical Significance
Google responds to the claim that Street View invades the
privacy of the people it photographs by equating Street View's function
with that of a live person walking down a street and looking around and
up at her surroundings. 1 Thus, Google contends, photographing and
publishing images of street faqades does not violate the privacy of its
subjects any more than a regular citizen violates her neighbor's privacy
when she walks down the road to get a newspaper. While Google's
assertion that Street View is equivalent to what any person could view
while walking down the street52 appears accurate at first glance, it seems
hollow in light of certain physical aspects of Street View's technology.
For example, Google's recent addition of a fifty-foot vertical pan/zoom
option in certain metropolises adds extra-human viewing capacity to the
conventional view, a fact which Google emphasized as a selling point in
its own press release announcing the arrival of this feature. 3 Street View
users have also found numerous images that do contain content invisible,
or not very visible, to the naked eye on the street. For example, one
blogger found pictures of the interior of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel in
New York City, an area off limits to cameras since September 11, 200 L"
Furthermore, the fact that Street View publicizes moments in
time that might otherwise go completely unnoticed also contradicts
Google's position that Street View reveals nothing more than does a
stroll around town. For instance, images of women unknowingly baring
their undergarments, women sunbathing in vulnerable positions, and men
entering strip clubs or erotic shops have already become the subject of
significant Internet attention." A few photographs even seem to portray
50 Another example of tension between a Google service and privacy law has recently
emerged from the U.S. Justice Department's issuance of subpoenas to Google and other Interet
search providers regarding individuals' Internet search queries. Dempsey, supra note 3, at 442-45.
Over Google's objection, the government requested records of both the text entered by a user into
Google's search engine and the resulting URLs the engine provided. Id. at 443-44. While the court
did allow the government to obtain sample URLs from Google's search index, it drew the line at
search text in large part for concern "about the privacy of Google's users." Id. at 443.
51 Helft, supra note 37, at C I. According to a Google company representative, "Street
View only features imagery taken on public property . . . [which] is no different from what any
person can readily capture or see walking down the street." Id.
52 For convenience, this Note will refer to the view that a person experiences while
physically walking down the street as the "conventional" view.
53 Lafon, supra note 29. As this Google software engineer noted, "[a]s an added bonus,
the images [of newly-added cities] are all in high resolution. But wait! There's more. Ever wish you
could pan up to the very top of a 50-story skyscraper using Street View? Well, prepare yourself for
some serious sightseeing .... (Remember to use caution if you have a fear of heights!)." Id.
54 Bryan Eisenberg, How Does Google's New 'Street View' Get Illegal Pics? (May 31,
2007), http:/www.grokdotcom.com/2007/053 1/how-does-googles-new-street-view-get-illegal-picsl.
55 Agger, supra note 40; Helft, supra note 37.
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criminal acts in progress, such as a man scaling a fence with a set of
lock-picks dangling from his pocket 6 and a man physically attacking
another man on the street.57 Other images that reflect potentially sensitive
social issues include a man wearing a t-shirt displaying the Communist
flag,58 a group of people praying on the sidewalk, 9 and a woman entering
a portable HIV testing center.' Street View has not only memorialized
these passing details, but encourages "the scrutiny to be extended
indefinitely."'"
It might be argued that all of the sensitive images described
above could have been seen by a live witness at the same point in time
the Street View cameras filmed them. However, one crucial (if obvious)
difference between a live person observing the events above and Street
View is reproducibility, which, when combined with the power of the
360-degree camera to capture all views simultaneously, is the true
indicator of Street View's impact. While an observer of any one of these
events could describe it to a third party, he is unlikely to be able to recall
the event perfectly via photographic evidence to an unlimited audience as
often as he likes.62 Accordingly, Street View does much more than
provide panoramic views that a live person would experience walking
down the street. It also simultaneously prepares an image for unlimited
distribution, reproduction, downloading, and other secondary uses.63
Also, Street View provides a full, simultaneous 360-degree view of an
area, which, without some dizzying head snapping, could not be
accomplished by a human viewer. In this sense, Street View is a lot
56 Ryan Singel, Request for Urban Street Sightings: Submit and Vote on the Best Urban
Images Captured by New Google Maps Tool, Wired.com (May 30, 2007),
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/05/request for-urb.html (featuring a snapshot of "Crime
Guy").
57 Street Fight, Google Sightseeing.com (June 16,2007), http://googlesightseeing.com/2007/06/
16/street-fiqht (last visited Sept. 26, 2007) (showing images of street fight captured frame-by-frame).
Google Street View Gallery, http://streetviewgallery.corank.comtech/framed/communist-
ipod-Advertising (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
59 Google Street View Gallery, http://streetviewgallery.corank.com/tech/framed/praying-
on-the-sidewalk (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
60 Google Street View Gallery, http://streetviewgallery.corank.comtech/framed/hiv-
Testingjust-a-walk-in-the-park (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
61 McClurg, supra note 5, at 1042 (making a similar observation with respect to the
effect produced by a photographer taking pictures of a couple at an outdoor farmers' market).
62 Jim Barr Coleman makes a similar argument regarding digital photography, noting as
well the cheapness and ease with which one can access a computer and the Internet. Jim Barr
Coleman, Note, Digital Photography and the Internet, Rethinking Privacy Law, 13 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 205, 221 (2005). The recent proliferation of camera phones is another phenomenon that has led to
the increased possibility of being photographed in public, as with South Korea's "Dog Poop Girl."
See infra text accompanying notes 74-77. For an interesting treatment of the significance of the
increasingruresence of camera phones in modem America, see Werbach, supra note 33, at 2327-28.
For example, information about where a photograph was taken-which is clearly one
of the special services Street View provides-"adds rich 'metadata' that can be employed in
countless ways. In effect, location information links the physical world to the virtual meta-world of
sensor data." Werbach, supra note 33, at 2332.
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closer to the mechanical eye of the Terminator than the naked eye of the
casual human observer.'
As a solution for those who feel their privacy has been invaded
by Street View, Google points to its "simple" process for removal of
objectionable images.65 Yet removal of the images addresses only half of
the problem for those whose images have become the subject of the
intense online fallout that occurs when a scandalous image is
discovered.' As Kevin Bankston noted with respect to his own situation,
Street View's removal procedures do little to ameliorate the damage
done when the objectionable image has already been discovered (and
likely disseminated) by random users.67 And as one blogger noted, there
is no guarantee that a person's image appears in only one Street View
photograph, so in order to ensure complete removal a user will have to
do some significant Internet research and still can only hope for the
best.68 Further, removal of an objectionable image does nothing to affect
the availability of the image if it has already been downloaded by a user
or embedded in a different website. For example, Michael Agger's article
on Street View contains live links to two images that Google has
removed from Street View, one of a man urinating on the street and the
other of a woman getting into a car and exposing her thong underwear.69
64 Professor Clifford Fishman agrees that the Internet has revolutionized the possibilities
of disseminating information:
Until recently, it was usually difficult to disseminate information about
another.... If the mass media . . declined to publish or broadcast the information,
someone hoping to disseminate it was out of luck.
Today, the Internet has obliterated those restraints. [People] can disseminate
even the most private information about individuals at will; and if the information tickles
the public fancy, information about private people can world "news" within days.
Fishman, supra note 3, at 1511 (footnotes omitted).
65 Posting of Peter Fleischer to Google Lat Long Blog,
http://googlelationg.blogspot.com/2007/09/street-view-and-privacy.html (Sept. 24, 2007 7:01 EST),
66 As one commentator noted,
[w]hat Street View demonstrates is the magnifying effect of technology,
especially Google technology. People drive by the Stanford campus every day and see
attractive co-eds searching for the optimum tanning angle. But when those same co-eds
are captured by the Google camera, the men of the Web go a little crazy and 100 links to
the "Girls of Escondido Road" bloom.
Agger, supra note 40.
67 Poulsen, supra note 42. Other bloggers and Internet users agree that unless the
offensive or embarrassing image is removed before others find it, removal of the image seems
useless. E.g., Posting of Anonymous to Search Engine Roundtable.com,
http://www.seroundtable.comarchives/013780.htm (June 8, 2007, 17:09 EST) (responding to
removal of Street View image of a woman exposing her underwear and backside, "Of course, the
damage is already done. This woman's ass is all over the Internet."); Posting of Jason Striegel to
Hacks Blog, http://www.hackszine.com/blog/archive/2007/06/removing-yourself from-street.htm
(June 17, 2007, 21:05 EST) ("[I]f someone else has already caught you [on Street View], there's no
point in removing the image anymore. Effectively, you'll need to find any compromising images
before anyone else does.").
8 Striegel, supra note 67.
69 Agger, supra note 40.
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Thus, Google's reliance on the removal of images from Street View as
the answer to its potential privacy issues is at most self-serving, and at
the least inattentive to the true depths of the problems Street View can create.
Another aspect of Street View that distinguishes it from
photographs of public areas taken from the conventional view is the level
of popularity and notoriety that Street View enjoys among frequent
Internet-users. Google reports that the web post through which it first
announced the launch of Street View was one of Google's five most-
often read posts in 2007, and the phrase "street view" was one of the
year's most popular keyword searches. 7' The online clamor regarding
Street View itself and its potential privacy problems has even led some
websites to solicit user submissions of the most provocative Street View
images," and it has actually spawned (at the time of this Note) at least
ten other websites that catalogue, rank, and display Street View photos.7
The palpable online interest in disseminating Street View photos is
noteworthy because it significantly heightens the probability that a
certain number of users will view any particular photo and that the juicier
images will become the objects of excessive scrutiny.
The practical consequences for individuals whose images have
been captured online are wide-ranging and sometimes destructive. 73 For
example, South Korea's infamous "Dog Poop Girl" was socially
ostracized in her home country and vilified internationally after a digital
photograph showing the girl's unwillingness to clean up her dog's
excrement on a subway was disseminated on the Internet.74 Once the
picture was posted on the Internet, bloggers sounded a "call to arms" for
information about her, which quickly yielded the girl's identity and
70 Maslan, supra note 16.
71 See, e.g., Steve Johnson, Show Us Your Google Street View Chicago Finds, CHI. TRIB.
Oct. 17, 2007, http://featuresblogs.chicagotribune.com/technology-Intemetcritic/2007/10/show-us-
your-go.html; Posting of Stan Schroeder to Mashable.com, http://mashable.com2007/05/31/top-15-
google-street-view-sightings/ (May 31, 2007, 11:05 PDT); Posting of Ryan Singel to Wired Blog
Network, http://blog.wired.com27bstroke6/2007/05/request for-urb.html (May 30, 2007, 15:31
EST).
72 E.g., Laudontech.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2008), Onmylist.com (last visited Oct. 15,
2008), Mashable.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2008), Kongtechnology.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2008),
StreetViewFun.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2008), Clipmarks.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2008),
Streetviewr.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2008), Linkinn.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2008),
GStreetSightings.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2008), and Streetviewgallery.corank.com (updated every
4 hours) (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
73 One example of online conflict spilling into real life is the case of Jewish Defense
Org., Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), in
which the defendant hired companies to create websites devoted to defaming the plaintiff (in
addition to defaming the plaintiff on his own website) and registered the plaintiff's name as a URL
address. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical
Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 117 (2003). The plaintiff retaliated by "slamm[ing] a
steaming bowl of soup on the defendant's head. The case escalated further when one of the parties
opened fire, wounding an innocent bystander." Id.
74 Werbach, supra note 33, at 2366-67 (citing Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates
into Test of the Internet's Power to Shame, WASH. POST, July 7, 2005, at Dl).
2008]
BROOKLYN LA W REVIEW
details about her past.75 Soon people were able to identify her by the dog
and the kind of purse she wore, and "Dog Poop Girl" was eventually
forced to quit college due to the public harassment she experienced.76 As
Professor Daniel Solove pointed out with respect to this incident, online
images are increasingly functioning as "digital scarlet letters," with
bloggers playing the role of "cyber-posse" that track and brand violators
of social norms.77 As a result, some have noted, "[o]ne single act
available to a world-wide audience may now define you for the rest of
your life. 78 Street View, therefore, is a source of constant fuel for this
online firestorm, in which disproportionately severe social sanctions can
be doled out by any person or group with an Internet connection.79
Examples of the powerful reverberations that online images can
produce are usually found in the employment context, as more and more
employers search social networking sites for information about job
candidates that might not be revealed in an interview.8° Non-job seekers,
however, are equally vulnerable to harm from unwanted Internet
publicity generated by an online photo,8 as Allison Stokke, a high school
champion pole vaulter, recently learned. The California teenager's
experience with unwelcome Internet fame is particularly relevant to the
Street View controversy, beginning as it did with a photo taken in public
of an unaware subject.
75 Jonathan Krirn, Subway Fracas Escalates Into Test of the Internet's Power to Shame,
WASH. POST, July 7, 2005, at Dl.
76 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
77 Id.
78 Frank Vascellaro, Company Helps You Defend Your Online Reputation, WCCO-
TV.com (May 17, 2007), hUp/Avcco.com/topstoies/Intemetpivacyieputafiondefender.2.367458.hti.
79 The flurries of web activity that lead to the imposition of these social sanctions are
known as "flaming sessions," which "are the functional equivalent of public verbal lashings." Rustad
& Koenig, supra note 73, at 117 (internal quotation marks omitted). One author, however, argues
that such increased social transparency (and the consequent increased certainty that misbehavior will
be detected) is actually a public good, considering the widespread self-editing of undesirable
behavior that theoretically should occur. DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL
TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 334 (1998). Moreover,
once society's initial thirst for others' personal information is satiated, that information might come
to be perceived as mundane and uninteresting. Id. at 334-35. A key component missing from this
proposition, however, is that most people would likely expect and demand a level of proportionality
in the punishment that social wrongdoers receive. This Note contends that until proportionality can
somehow be addressed, unfettered social lashings likely do more harm than good. For examples of
people who have experienced tangible harms arising out of Internet harassment, see notes 73, 81-87,
89 and accompanying text.
80 Wei Du, Job Candidates Get Tripped Up by Facebook, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 14, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 20202935/; see generally Ian Bymside, Note, Six Clicks of
Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites to Research
Applicants, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445 (2008).
81 For example, a Duke University basketball player was suspended after he passed out at
a fraternity house, someone photographed him asleep while some people "drew on him with a magic
marker and pressed their genitalia against his face," and the photo turned up on the Internet in a
widely disseminated email. Coleman, supra note 62, at 206-07. Another example is the experience
of a TV newscaster who lost her job when images of her participation in a wet t-shirt contest turned
up on various pornographic websites. Id. at 207.
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In May 2007, a sports journalist photographed Stokke waiting
around at a meet in her tight-fitting spandex uniform, which he posted on
a prep school track-and-field website.8 2 A popular sports blogger in New
York then lifted the photo and made it the subject of four paragraphs of
lewd "locker room talk."83 Within days, Stokke's image was searched for
and downloaded by thousands of Internet users, dozens of blogs and
message boards linked or published the item, her MySpace account
received thousands of messages, hundreds of users posted their sexual
fantasies about Stokke on message boards and chat forums, an unofficial
fan site was launched, and an imposter created a fake Facebook profile
under her name. 4 The wave of online attention was also matched by real-
life attention. The number of photographers who attended Stokke's meets
doubled, Stokke's high school received hoards of requests for her picture
from newspapers and periodicals, "including one from a risqu6 magazine
in Brazil," and Stokke began being recognized by strangers in public and
receiving countless random phone calls.8 5 As Stokke and her attorney
father note, however, "none of it is illegal," even while the
objectification and scrutiny she suffered was personally "demeaning."86
Stokke's feeling of helplessness throughout her transformation
into an unwitting Internet pinup-girl is reminiscent of many individuals'
experiences with unwanted publication of photographs.87 Academics
have long decried the failure of existing privacy law to protect
"unsuspecting celebrities,"88 people who were photographed in public
and whose images were widely publicized by others, which has led to
many case outcomes in which such plaintiffs were unable to recover
because their picture was taken in public.89 Street View therefore




85 Id. Stokke's father now makes searching the Internet for potential stalkers a daily
activity. Id.
86 Id. The reasons why Stokke (or other similarly situated plaintiffs) likely does not have
a viable claim under the privacy torts are discussed in Part IIB, infra.
87 Other individuals who have been on the receiving end of malicious Internet scrutiny
include Sue Scheff, a counselor for troubled teens, who was vilified on PTA web sites in her home
state and even threatened in YouTube videos after a former client turned against her. Susan Kinzie &
Ellen Nakashima, Calling in Pros to Refine Your Google Image, WASH. POST, July 2, 2007, at Al.
Politicians, lobbyists, real estate moguls, academics, fund managers and securities traders are also
among those who have been subjected to negative attacks online. Id.
88 Siprut, supra note 5, at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 E.g., id. at 311-13 (describing the legal helplessness of people whose publicly-taken
photos were selected as the cover page of national periodicals, the cover of a guidebook to nude
beaches, and even as an insert to a photo spread in a pornographic magazine); Coleman, supra note
62, at 206-08 (describing inability of plaintiffs to recover for damages when their images were
disseminated online to their social and economic detriment); McClurg, supra note 5, at 992-94
(detailing failed attempts to recover under privacy torts by plaintiff of whom video footage was used
in a commercial without her consent, a plaintiff who was coerced into a provocative pose for a
photograph, and plaintiffs whose photographs were published in a pornographic magazine without
consent); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196-98 (noting that the "modem enterprise and
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exacerbates this problem by providing an endless array of downloadable
photographs of buildings and the people in or near them, especially in
cities filmed in high-definition resolution where even people standing
inside glass storefronts or a few floors up are identifiable.
C. Online Image Management
Despite Street View's arguably invasive features, for many, its
appearance is a logical extension of a modem understanding of privacy
in which surveillance by private actors is expected and approved.9" The
apparent ease with which Internet users will accept surveillance by
certain parties, however, stands in tension with a desire to maintain a
degree of control over the dissemination of personal online information."'
This Note contends that this desire to control, in combination with the
burgeoning industry of online reputation defenders, comprises a field of
personal privacy, dubbed "online image management" for present
purposes, 92 that should be recognized by courts.93
For example, one recent survey found that people's attitudes
toward the relative intrusiveness of a covert camera with zoom capacity
used to monitor streets fell about halfway between the perceived
intrusiveness of camera surveillance of convenience and retail stores
invention" necessitate protection of one's own image from unwanted publication, but that "[oin the
other hand, our law recognizes no principle upon which compensation [for such an injury] can be
granted").
90 See, e.g., Werbach, supra note 33, at 2322 ("The [electronic] sensors will be so
ubiquitous, and so innocuous, that we will have to get used to them."); Coleman, supra note 62, at
233-34 ("There is little doubt that the upsides to the technological advancements ... far outweigh
the downside.... However, with these advancements we must be willing to sacrifice some of...
our privacy."); Mike Rogoway, Smile, You're on Google, OREGONIAN, Oct. 11, 2007, at Al
("Americans generally seem to welcome the avalanche of data and accept a corresponding loss of
privacy ...I haven't seen major signs of revolt.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
University of Oregon law professor Garrett Epps); Editorial, Street Smart: The Region Gets Virtual
Treatment from Google, PrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 16, 2007, at B6 ("[W]e are now a place
where people can stroll down busy streets and navigate through thickets of tall buildings without
having to get out of their pajamas. This is the new face of Pittsburgh progress. Get used to it.");
Allen, supra note 4, at 736 ("[Y]ounger Americans appear to be learning to live reasonably well and
happily without privacy. Young adults seem to take exposure for granted and many understand that
they live in virtual glass houses."). Even teenagers, however, draw a distinction between private and
governmental surveillance, suggesting a burgeoning sense among younger generation that the
exposure of personal information on the Internet is a normal part of daily life, even while they
remain skeptical about the government's attempts to collect information available online. Justin
Berton, The Age of Privacy: Gen Y Not Shy About Sharing-but Worries About Spying, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., May 20, 2006, at Al.
91 See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
92 While the phrase "online reputation management" is used with reference to negative
textual publicity from bloggers or websites by service provides, see infra note 109, this Note uses the
phrase online image management to highlight the photographic element of Street View-based harms.
Many of the same arguments in support of judicial recognition of online image management could
apply to online reputation management.
93 See infra Part Il.
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(low) and that of the overt use of cameras to survey streets (high).'
While it appears that the "knowledge that cameras are present trigger[ed]
a greater feeling of intrusion than knowledge that cameras might be
present,"95 Street View-style surveillance-unseen cameras with zoom
capacity used to monitor streets-was not perceived as the most intrusive
form of camera surveillance.96 Interestingly, even in Canada, a country
with much more robust legal protection for personal privacy, a recent
poll shows that the majority of Canadians think "people are over-reacting
[sic]" to Street View's potential invasions of privacy.97
This sense of approval of private surveillance is also linked to
the increasingly prominent role that online images play in modern
society. "Indeed, armed with nothing more than cameras and Internet
connections, young Americans have become foot soldiers in a cultural
revolution."98 Additionally, the current understanding of how online
images should be managed or controlled among avid Internet users is
surprisingly nuanced. For example, a woman who has been a "Web cam
entrepreneur"" for over twelve years does not mind "sharing really
intense personal experiences" when she has "control of that flow of
information," but is concerned that government surveillance programs
may undermine that control "without [her] consent."'"
Members of Facebook, the immensely popular Internet social
networking web site, can access a forum called "30 Reasons Girls Should
Call It a Night," consisting of over 4000 pictures showing girls in various
stages of intoxication (the vast majority depicting unconscious and semi-
clothed young women) that the girls themselves posted with
commentary.' °' Internet bloggers claim the forum is the fastest growing
94 Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the
Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 275-85 (2003). It should be noted that the study was designed
to measure respondents' attitudes toward police use of camera surveillance, not specifically of use
by private companies. One reason for this was that at the time the study was conducted, "[n]o entity
other than the government engage[d] in concerted, overt surveillance of the public streets using
cameras." Id. at 273. Despite the different purpose of the study, however, we can still glean a useful
insight from the relative levels of intrusiveness that people ascribed to Street View-style surveillance
methods compared to other methods of camera surveillance described on the surveys.
95 Id. at 279 (first emphasis added).
96 Id. at 277-79. Both overt camera surveillance of streets and the use of a camera able to
overhear conversations on the street were ranked much higher by survey respondents in terms of
intrusiveness. Id. at 277.
97 Click Counter, GLOBE & MAIL (CANADA), Sept. 20, 2007, at B17 (reporting results of
a poll of Globe and Mail readers, 58% of respondents felt Street View is not a privacy threat).
98 Note, In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Privacy Law, 120
HARv. L. REv. 1870, 1870 (2007).
99 A "Web cam entrepreneur" is a person who maintains a website from which she
charges users a fee to watch her conduct her daily life, usually including highly private events such
as using the bathroom, sleeping, or engaging in sexual relations. See, e.g., Berton, supra note 90, at
Al. These sites are also sometimes called "Girl-Cam" websites.
100 Id.
101 30 Reasons Girls Should Call It a Night, BuzzFeed.com, http://www.buzzfeed.com
buzz/30_ReasonsGirls_ ShouldCall_ It aNight (last visited Aug. 31, 2008).
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group on Facebook and may boast 200,000 members.1 12 Yet the public's
access to this Forum is still limited by Facebook's requirement that a
user subscribe to the site to view pictures." 3 Thus, it seems that many
people embrace the apparent contradiction of wanting to create an
Internet profile comprised of personal images, while simultaneously
retaining a measure of control over how those images are disseminated."°
More evidence of the burgeoning importance of online image
management is the recent appearance of a cottage industry to enhance
individuals' ability to control their identities and images that appear on
the Internet."°5 Companies like International Reputation Management,
Naymz, and ReputationDefender offer to repair damage done by hostile
bloggers, which they measure by searching for a client's name on Google
and other search engines and evaluating the amount of negative links that
appear.'O° To improve a client's online image (both pictorial and
reputational), the companies request the removal of negative posts or
comments and may even threaten litigation on a client's behalf.0 7
Another method is to flood the Internet with positive comments or items
about the client to counteract the negative information already out
there. ' 8 Online image or reputation management, therefore, is more than
just a cautionary step for recent college graduates and hopeful job
seekers. It is fast becoming a profitable activity for service providers,"°9
and more than ever, a necessary prophylactic for the vast number of
people who maintain Internet profiles and images of themselves.
Therefore, Street View's prominence and scope have far-
reaching consequences for the Internet community and society in
general. While Google asserts that the application is the equivalent of a
102 Id.
103 Id. The efficacy of Facebook's security measures has been called into question,
however. Experts have warned users that program codes are easy to obtain online that bypass blocks
on an individual's Facebook profile pages that are designated "private." Terry Webster, On Web,
Privacy is Just an Illusion, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, July 24, 2007. One highly-publicized
example of such a security breach was the recent attempt to blackmail Miss New Jersey, Amy
Polumbo, with scandalous photographs lifted from her private Facebook page. Id.
104 See Berton, supra note 90, at Al.
105 Kinzie & Nakashima, supra note 87, at Al ("Google's ubiquity as a research tool has
given rise to a new industry: online identity management.").
106 Id. Because search engines usually rank results of a search by frequency (how often
the search term appears on the web site), bloggers can make it appear that the only news about a
person is negative by using the person's name over and over again in their posts to artificially boost
the negative blog in the search engine rankings.
107 Vascellaro, supra note 78.
108 Kinzie & Nakashima, supra note 87, at Al.
109 For example, in September 2008, fifteen global brands, including Unilever, Clifford
Chance, and American Airlines, sent panelists to an international conference on international
corporate reputation management with a focus on online disparagement. International Reputation
Management Summit, http://slicemedia.blogspot.comV2008/07/intemational-reputation-
management.html (July 29, 2008, 12:29). Additionally, online reputation management has its own
fairly extensive Wikipedia.org entry that provides a link to an online reputation management buyer's
guide (in print, no less). Online Reputation Management, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Online-
Reputation-Management (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
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person walking down the street and snapping photos, that contention is
self-serving at best. Qualitative differences in image resolution, in the
possibilities of image reproduction, storage, and dissemination, and in
the zooming and panning options on Street View indicate that Street
View is indeed a different animal. Further, Google's image-removal
process provides little comfort to those who have been caught in
sensitive positions and must suffer the real-life consequences.
As an individual's ability to control his or her image online is an
increasingly crucial aspect of everyday life in the Internet age, Street
View takes on even more cultural significance. Specifically, Street View
has weakened our society's formal and physical protections of privacy by
engendering a novel species of voyeurism and providing the tools to
achieve those voyeuristic goals. However, while Street View's general
acceptance might signal that our society is outgrowing some of those
protections and is comfortable with being surveyed by private actors,
more individuals than ever before find themselves faced with real-life
consequences stemming from interference with or unwanted
dissemination of online images. Thus, if society ever wants to regain the
pre-Street View balance between the formal and physical protections of
personal privacy, legal institutions and players alike will have to
negotiate the impact of Street View on current privacy law.
II. How CLAIMS AGAINST STREET VIEW WOULD TAKE SHAPE
UNDER CURRENT PRIVACY LAW
The word "privacy" has been ascribed so many different
meanings throughout legal history that its usefulness is often called into
doubt. " ' As one prominent scholar explained, "[hiaving fudged the
concept of privacy we have put ourselves in a position where we cannot
discern the interest we seek to protect, but only the situation which
involves it.""' The uncertainty of what "privacy" is, however, does not
lessen the importance of its role as a shield for regular citizens from the
government or other civilian actors." 2 Regardless of the intellectual
11o See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2002)
(surveying scholars and philosophers who bemoan the slipperiness of privacy as a legal concept);
Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 272, 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) ("Perhaps the most striking thing
about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is."); Ruth
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422, 425-26 (1980) (noting that to be
useful a concept of privacy must be "distinct and coherent," and rejecting descriptions of it as a
"claim, a psychological state, [] an area that should not be invaded," or "a form of control"); William
H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law
Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way Baby, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1974)
("[Wlidely divergent claims, which upon analysis have very little in common with one another, are
lumped under the umbrella of 'privacy."').
"' Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 39 (1967).
112 See Rehnquist, supra note 110, at 3, 14. Rehnquist notes that "[olne of the basic
questions that must be answered by any organized society is the extent to which the government
shall regulate the lives of its citizens." Id. at 14. That being said, "before any sort of meaningful
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murkiness that may always surround it as a legal concept, some
anthropologists and historians argue that notions of and desires for
personal privacy are actually hardwired into the Homosapien species." 3
If an intrinsic human urge is at work behind the frequency with which
notions of privacy appear in legal discourse, then perhaps it also explains
privacy's persistent migration from constitutional law to tort law to
criminal law and beyond,"4 despite our collective inability to agree on
what it is."5
A full treatment of privacy's numerous legal incarnations,
however, is beyond the scope of this Note. Thus, this Section will discuss
how a privacy-based claim against Google Street View might take shape
under the American torts of privacy. For purposes of convenience and
scope, this Section will only evaluate the potential claims of an "outside"
plaintiff, a person filmed by Street View while he or she was on public
streets (as distinguished from people photographed while inside
buildings or homes)." 6 Moreover, while the putative Street View
analysis can be undertaken, we need to know precisely what is meant by the concept of 'privacy.'
Id. at3.
113 MCLEAN, supra note 12, at 9-15 . "Anthropological and historical evidence .. .is
sufficient to indicate that a demand for various kinds of privacy and an intuitive understanding of
them are built into human beings." Id. at 9.
114 According to one commentator, "[tihe 'right' of privacy has been discussed in over
700 Supreme Court opinions since that Court's inception and in many lower court opinions over the
same time." Keck, supra note 6, at 95, n.74 (citing AMITAI ETzIoNI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 188-90
(Basic Books 1999)). For an illuminating history of the use of the word privacy in Supreme Court
opinions, see Keck, supra note 6, at 99-104.
115 Professor Daniel Solove suggests that the primary reason for the splintered nature of
privacy as a legal construct is a result of the top-down analytic approach, in which "theorists look for
a common set of necessary and sufficient elements that single out privacy as unique from other
conceptions." Solove, supra note 110, at 1095. By attempting to distill what privacy "is," we lose the
contextual understanding of specific facts or practices that are usually the very circumstances that
give abstract knowledge much of its meaning. Id. at 1127-28. Professor Solove propounds a
pragmatist approach to the study of privacy that "conceptualizes privacy within particular contexts
rather than in the abstract." Id. at 1129.
116 An additional reason for this limitation is the reality that thus far, aside from Mary
Kalin-Casey's experience, few Street View images depict recognizable people or objects inside
buildings. To date, the only lawsuit against Google stemming from Street View was filed in the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas by a couple living on a private road in April 2008. Zusha
Elinson, Boring Couple Sues Google Over Street View, LAW.COM, Apr. 7, 2008,
http://www.law.comljsp/article.jsp?id=1207305794776. According to their complaint, Mr. and Mrs.
Boring reside at the end of a lane clearly marked "Private Road." Complaint 6, Boring v. Google,
Inc., No. 2:2008cv00694 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2008), available at
http://docs.justia-comcases/federal/district-courts/pennsylvania/pawdce/2:2008cvOO694/86623// Thus,
the appearance of the couple's house and swimming pool on Street View could only have been
accomplished by the Street View car disregarding the Private Road sign and driving onto private
property. Id. TT 9-11. The Borings sued under the intrusion upon seclusion tort, trespass, and
negligence for $25,000 in damages, and requested that the court enjoin Google from continuing to
post the image of their house and destroy any of its existing images. Id. IT 17-23. In its motion to
dismiss the subsequently amended complaint, Google responded that there was no private road sign
and that a photo of the Borings' home was already available on the local county assessor's website.
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 11, Boring v. Google, Inc., No. 2:2008cv00694 (W.D.
Pa. Aug. 14, 2008) (on file with author). To date, the district court has not ruled on Google's motion.
This case, however, is distinguishable from the hypothetical situations discussed infra, because here
the plaintiffs can rely on an explicit "Private Road" sign to demark their reasonable sphere of
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plaintiff s claim under the privacy torts may seem to overlap with the tort
of defamation, this Section will not address defamation law because it
provides compensation for injury to reputation and financial position, not
the actual invasion of privacy that the privacy torts are meant to cover.117
The Section will conclude by exploring the particular challenges posed
by an Internet phenomenon such as Street View and why reconciling
new technology and old law is often so problematic.
A. Origins and Development of the Torts of Privacy
Concern for privacy in the United States dates back to the
nation's Founding Fathers, who enshrined in the Bill of Rights the
guarantee that the government refrain from intruding into its citizens'
homes, private papers, religious choices, associational choices, and
choices of conscience."8 These constitutional guarantees, however, do
not supply the substance of privacy; they only mark the contours of those
"situations of privacy" that will be safeguarded by the law.'19 As such,
what is or is not private shifts in our constitutional tradition according to
context' and in conjunction with what the public reasonably perceives
to be private.'' Further, as the late Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in
his influential essay on the subject, tensions arise in privacy
jurisprudence because "quite reasonable claims to privacy find
themselves competing with equally reasonable claims weighing against
the privacy interest."'2 Courts must therefore balance privacy claims in
light of the parties' and society's expectations. This responsibility has
perhaps never been so complicated as now, when the personal computer
and the Internet have revolutionized individuals' methods of
expected privacy, whereas the putative Street View plaintiffs discussed in this Section do not rely on
a sphere of expected privacy by virtue of their appearance on a public street.
117 Another reason for refraining from exploring defamation is that only untrue statements
or content is actionable under the defamation tort, while Street View's images are "true" in a literal
sense and are thus not proper subjects for this branch of law anyway. See David A. Myers,
Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet: A Case Study of Cyber Targeting, 1 10 PENN
ST. L. REV. 667, 674-75 (2006) (explaining that in order to state a claim a defamation plaintiff must
allege that the defamatory statements are false).
118 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, ET AL., PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 28-29 (2006)
(summarizing the privacy aspects of the U.S. Constitution's First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments); see also Anita L. Allen-Castellitto, Understanding Privacy: The Basics, 865 PLI/Pat
23, 27 (2006).
119 Gross, supra note I 11, at 36.
120 For example, a person has different privacy rights in the workplace depending on
whether her employer is a governmental entity or in the private sector. See Rustad & Koenig, supra
note 73, at 95 (describing vastly diminished privacy rights of employees who work for private
companies).
121 Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 846 (2002) ("[C]ourts define privacy by reference to society's prevailing
understanding of what is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Because this conception of privacy
tracks societal expectations, what is protected as private will vary in accordance with relevant social
changes.").
122 Rehnquist, supra note 110, at 18.
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communication, self-determination, information-collection, and
information storage, all of which courts must consider when adjudicating
a claim that turns on reasonable expectations of privacy.'23
According to a vast majority of scholars, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis took the first key step in the formation of civil privacy
law when they published their seminal article, The Right to Privacy." As
Professor McClurg observes:
Warren and Brandeis surveyed a number of decisions in the areas of
defamation, property, implied contract, and copyright law and concluded that,
in reality, they represented recognition of a right to privacy. They asserted that
this right, which they characterized as "the right to be let alone," should be
recognized as an independent tort.'25
Warren and Brandeis aimed to uncover a source in common law
to protect the individual's "inviolate personality" but did not define this
concept further.'26 They argued that privacy of this sort (which many
would later dub personal or information privacy' 27) should be judicially
recognized in torts to protect people from the "modern enterprise and
invention[s]" of the media, which they believed caused more overall
mental pain and suffering than the physical harm tort law normally
compensates.'28 Thus, in addition to setting the terms of privacy
discourse for decades to come, Warren and Brandeis's article pioneered
the use of "injury to the feelings" '29 as the showing of harm that tort law
123 Indeed, "[iun this period of intemet snooping into private people's lives and stealing of
identities, courts must often balance people's need for privacy against the requirements of our
functioning legal system." Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 224 F.R.D. 536, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). And
while the Internet has provided a plethora of challenges to personal or information privacy, the
concern itself predates the personal computer. In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to New York's statute requiring doctors prescribing certain drugs to provide the state with
a copy of the prescription for the purpose of patient data collection and monitoring. Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 593-95 (1977). The Court did not believe that the statute would pose a serious danger,
but it noted the "threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of ... personal information in
computerized data banks." Id. at 605. Further, in his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
acknowledged that a person's "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an aspect of the
right of privacy." Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice
Brennan also noted that he was most troubled that the "central storage and easy accessibility of
computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information." Id. at 606-07.
Information privacy's role in modem conceptions of privacy will be discussed more fully in Part Ill.
124 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1. "The article has been described as 'the very fount of
learning on the subject."' McClurg, supra note 5, at 997 n.33 (1995) (quoting Edward J. Bloustein,
Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional
As Well?, 46 TEx. L. REv. 611, 611 (1968)); accord Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis's
Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIs L.J. 643, 643-44 (2007); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 958-59 (1989);
Solove, su{ ra note 110, at 1099-1100.
McClurg, supra note 5, at 997 (footnotes omitted).
126 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
127 See, e.g., Chemerinksy, supra note 124, at 651 ("In their famous article, Warren and
Brandeis urged tort law protection for public disclosure of private facts. Their focus was entirely on
informational privacy.").
128 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
129 Id. at 197.
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requires, even though at the time of their article's publication, tort law
did not easily recognize psychological or emotional types of harm. 3'
Decades later, Warren and Brandeis's themes were refined by
Dean William Prosser, who was responsible for the next watershed
moment in privacy law. 3 ' Prosser collected and analyzed state court
decisions involving privacy claims that had come down since the
publication of Warren and Brandeis's article, and concluded that the
common law notion of privacy was actually comprised of four distinct
torts of privacy."' They are: (1) "Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion
or solitude, or into his private affairs[;]" (2) "Public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff[J" (3) "Publicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye[;]" and
(4) "[Commercial] [a]ppropriation . . . of the plaintiff's name or
likeness."' 33 Dean Prosser's articulation of these four separate causes of
action was later adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
embraced his formulation almost verbatim.134 The states' acceptance of
Prosser's privacy torts, however, was not nearly as straightforward.
While more than half of the fifty states have accepted all four of the
privacy torts (as defined by the Restatement), several others have
declined to adopt the tort of false light.'35 Yet even in the states that claim
to accept all four privacy torts, plaintiffs often fail to recover due to both
a widespread "judicial wariness" of the privacy torts and certain
structural features of the torts that make them notoriously defendant-
friendly.'36
Therefore, although privacy was a central concern of the
Framers,'37 uncertainty persists in the legal community regarding what
privacy is, when it is violated, and how it should be protected. Warren
and Brandeis focused these issues significantly by identifying the media
and technological innovation as the key catalysts of society's progressive
130 Solove, supra note 110, at 1100-01 ("While the law of defamation protected injuries to
reputations, privacy involved injury to the feelings, a psychological form of pain that was difficult to
translate into the tort law of their times, which focused more on tangible injuries.") (internal
quotation marks omitted). For a revealing explanation of the social and factual backdrop to the
writing of Warren and Brandeis' article, see JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 6-7 (2000) and Prosser, supra note 2, at 383-84.
131 McClurg, supra note 5, at 997.
132 Siprut, supra note 5, at 315.
133 Prosser, supra note 2, at 389. Hereinafter, the four privacy torts will be referred to as
intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure, false light, and misappropriation.
'3 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B - 652E (1977); McClurg, supra note
5, at 998 & n.40 (noting that Prosser also served as Reporter for the Restatement and that his version
of the torts is essentially equivalent to the Restatement's).
135 Id. at 998-99; see also Helms, supra note 12, at 310 ("Even more troubling, from the
perspective of Internet privacy, is the fact that tort law varies significantly from state to state, with
some states recognizing all such torts and others recognizing none.").
136 McClurg, supra note 5, at 999-1007. The structural features of the four torts that make
them friendlier to defendants will be discussed in Part II.B.
137 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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loss of personal privacy.13 Dean Prosser continued this work by
demarcating the common law right of privacy into four separate but
interrelated torts.'3 9 However, despite the states' nominal acceptance of
Warren and Brandeis' right, as articulated by Prosser's torts, civil law
has yet to provide a firm foothold for plaintiffs alleging certain kinds of
invasions of privacy.
B. Why the Privacy Torts Fail the Street View Plaintiff
The putative Street View plaintiff faces many hurdles to
recovery in civil privacy law. Some obstacles are obvious: recall that
such a plaintiff would allege an invasion of privacy stemming from being
photographed by Street View while walking on a public street, but
because "[tiort law clings stubbornly to the principle that privacy cannot
be invaded in or from a public place," the image-subject effectively has
no legal recourse.'" Other obstacles are more subtle, such as the general
inability for plaintiffs to recover when they cannot describe their harm in
concrete terms,' or the fact that invasions of privacy must be deemed
highly offensive by society in order to be actionable.'42 This part will first
briefly sketch the formal elements of each privacy tort, in addition to any
other doctrinal features relevant to a Street View plaintiff. It will then
identify and explore the thematic obstacles apparent across the four torts
and how they affect a Street View plaintiff's chance for a successful claim.
1. Elements of the Four Privacy Torts
To recover under the first privacy tort, intrusion upon seclusion,
a plaintiff must show that a secret or private subject matter exists, that
she has the right to keep that information secret, and that the information
about the matter was discovered through unreasonable means."'
Additionally, "intrusion" can refer to the physical invasion of a
private place or "sensory intrusions such as . . . visual or photographic
spying."'" Regardless of what manner of intrusion is at hand, to be
actionable it must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person."'45 Thus,
138 See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
139 See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
14' McClurg, supra note 5, at 990; accord Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 489;
Coleman, supra note 62, at 225; Lance E. Rothenberg, Comment, Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping
Toms, Video Voyeurs, and the Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in the Public Space, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1127, 1147 (2000); Siprut, supra note 5, at 312.
141 See infra notes 216-217 and accompanying text.
142 See infra Part II.B.3.
143 Keck, supra note 6, at 106 (quoting Beaumont v. Brown, 237 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1975)).
144 Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 557 (quoting the leading case of Schulman v. Group
W Prods. Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489 (Cal. 1998)).
145 Keck, supra note 6, at 106 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord
Helms, supra note 12, at 310.
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some scholars have suggested that this tort is perfectly suited for victims
of "video voyeurism," which, though a close cousin of Street View, has
certain distinguishing features which bring it within the intrusion tort's reach.46
The tort of public disclosure of private facts provides an action
for the "disclosure of private information that is (1) widely disseminated;
(2) highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) not 'newsworthy' or
'of legitimate concern to the public."" 47 The Supreme Court drastically
undermined the efficacy of this tort in Florida Star v. B.J.F., when it
found that a rape victim could not collect damages from a newspaper for
publishing her name without her consent because the information was
truthful and the newspaper obtained it from publicly-available
documents."8 Thus, truthfulness and the extent to which information is
publicly available or easy to find will affect the "'private nature"' (i.e.,
legal actionability) of the disclosed information.149 Furthermore, when
the form of disclosure is a photograph, a plaintiffs identity must be
revealed by the image in order for him to recover. 5 ° The public
disclosure tort thus has a catch-22 effect, because a piece of private
information may be so widely disseminated by the disclosure as to
become public, which will then bar the plaintiffs success."' Therefore, a
putative plaintiff suing Street View under public disclosure for its
dissemination of "private" information may be offering up the very
evidence fatal to his cause of action. Because the accused Street View
image is of a public space, 52 Google can successfully argue that the
image's contents are not private to begin with because they were on
146 Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 557. Specifically, "video voyeurism" refers to the
clandestine videotaping of people while in dressing rooms, tanning booths, and bathrooms. Id. If in a
public place, it usually refers to "upskirting," the practice of placing small hidden cameras at low
angles to film women's underwear. Id. This phenomenon is not limited to women. Id. at 479.
According to Calvert and Brown, a plaintiff suing for video voyeurism that occurred in a dressing
room can easily prove the elements of intrusion, "assuming a jury finds that [video voyeurism] is
highly offensive conduct." Id. at 557. There is evidence that public opinion may be swinging that
way: in California, upskirting had become such a problem that the legislature amended its so-called
Peeping Tom laws to impose liability specifically for this conduct. David D. Kremenetsky,
Insatiable "Up-skirt" Voyeurs Force California Lawmakers to Expand Privacy Protection in Public
Places, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 285, 288-90 (2000).
147 Lin, supra note 3, at 1110 (quoting FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 90 (1997)).
148 Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); McClurg, supra note 5, at 1002 (citing
Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)). Interestingly, Prosser did not envision truthfulness to
be a defense to the publication of private facts. Prosser, supra note 2, at 398 ("[Public disclosure of
private facts] is in reality an extension of defamation .... with the elimination of the defense of the
truth.").
149 Keck, supra note 6, at 107 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reports Comm., 489 U.S.
749, 764 (1989)).
150 Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 564.
151 Lin, supra note 3, at 1110-11 (discussing the catch-22 effect of this tort regarding the
wrongful disclosure of private consumer databases, because "[diatabases that are widely
disseminated may be . . . [part of the] public record ... [and] not tortious ... [but] [c]onversely,
databases that are . . . seemingly private . . . are often considered not to have been widely
disseminated").
152 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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public display, and this tort by definition will not impose liability for
further disseminating information that is already public.'53
The third privacy tort, false light, requires a successful claimant
to show that the publicized information is both false and highly
offensive, and that defendant knew the information was untrue "or
recklessly disregarded its truth or falsity.' 54 With respect to Internet
information privacy, this tort is largely inapplicable because where the
privacy of personal information (e.g., Social Security or bank account
numbers) is concerned, the information is almost always true and thus
non-actionable.'55 If the information at issue is in the form of a
photograph or image, however, the false light tort would only provide a
legal recourse for someone whose image was "digitally manipulated to
create a false impression about the person identified in the image." '56
Thus, this tort is likely completely inapplicable to the Street View
plaintiff's situation, because any image a plaintiff might object to will be
"true' in a literal sense, even if the information it revealed was highly
offensive.
Finally, in order to recover under the fourth privacy tort,
commercial appropriation (or as it is also known, misappropriation157), a
153 This theoretical outcome is based on Jackson v. Playboy Enterprises, 574 F. Supp. 10
(S.D. Ohio 1983), discussed by Professor McClurg, supra note 5, at 993, 1008-09. In that case, three
young men who were lost asked a policewoman on the street for some directions and were
photographed without their consent while speaking with her. Id. at 1008. The policewoman later
appeared as a nude model in Playboy magazine, and the photograph of her speaking to the three boys
appeared next to her nude pictorial. Id. The court, however, dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under all
four privacy torts largely because "the photo was taken on a public sidewalk 'in plain view of the
public eye."' Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, on the issue of Playboy's dissemination of the
photo without the boys' consent, the court held that "'[tihere is no liability when the defendant
merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already public."' Jackson, 574
F. Supp. at 13 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 652D cmt.b (1977)). Indeed, this is one
of Google's arguments in the Boring case. See supra note 116.
154 FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 90 (1997). As Prosser noted, the
false light tort is very closely related to common law defamation. Prosser, supra note 2, at 400
("There has been a good deal of overlapping of defamation in the false light cases, and apparently
either action, or both, will very often lie.").
155 Lin, supra note 3, at 1111-12. To be clear, this insight is only relevant to
circumstances in which an individual's personal information is disclosed. When a person's
reputation is harmed via publications on the Internet, defamation law (either the common law tort or
statutory form) comes into play. Myers, supra note 117, at 679-85 (describing two recent cases
before the California Supreme Court involving Internet defamation).
156 Calvert &.Brown, supra note 4, at 565 (describing the experience of an actress whose
head was placed on the nude body of another woman and posted on a website as an example of a fact
pattern that fits inside the tort of false light). Moreover, like the tort of public disclosure, false light
will also not apply to a plaintiff unless she is identifiable in the image in dispute. See id. However,
"an identifiable facial representation" is not a "prerequisite to relief for appropriation." Id. at 563.
This principle comes from a New York case, Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 379 (1984),
in which the appellate court found that a plaintiff was indeed identifiable in an image by her "hair,
bone structure, body contours and stature and [her] posture." Id. at 385.
157 One commentator suggests that the tort of "right of publicity" is essentially equivalent
to misappropriation, although "doctrinal disorder" persists on this question. Note, supra note 98, at
1877-79. For example, in Henley v. Dillard Department Stores, the district court noted that the two
claims were different in name only. 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590 (N.D. Tex. 1999). By contrast, a
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plaintiff must prove that the defendant used an aspect of the plaintiffs
identity for his own advantage ("commercially or otherwise"), that the
plaintiff did not consent to this use, and that the plaintiff suffered some
resulting injury.'58 As a general matter, misappropriation is normally
invoked by celebrities against those who would profit from use of their
names or likenesses,"' even though the tort does not technically require a
plaintiff to be famous."6  A plaintiffs celebrity status, however, is
extremely useful in proving both the measure of plaintiffs loss and that
the defendant misappropriated his image for his own commercial gain. 6'
Another important consideration in this tort is the doctrine of incidental
use, which renders "fleeting" use of a likeness non-actionable.'62
2. Public Presence as Consent to Surveillance
Despite the robust body of law on privacy that Dean Prosser
developed, his own work demonstrated an extreme reluctance to
recognize invasions of privacy that take place in public.'63 Judges have
largely agreed with Prosser's viewpoint, as demonstrated by the many
cases where courts have prevented privacy claims from even reaching a
jury."6 Thus, as one scholar notes, the resulting current legal reality is
that "[t]ort law clings stubbornly to the principle that privacy cannot be
invaded in or from a public place."' 65 The rationale behind the general
rule that invasions of privacy cannot occur in public seems to have two
interconnected roots. The first root is contractual theory: because
"reasonable" people know that entering a public space is sure to entail
some degree of visibility to others, a person thus implicitly consents to
being watched by others when she is in a public area.'66 The other root is
California appellate court suggested that actually misappropriation is the root of the right of publicity
tort. See Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 313 (Ct. App. 2001).
158 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 873 (C.D. Cal. 1999); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
159 Note, supra note 98, at 1877-78.
160 Keck, supra note 6, at 107.
161 See Note, supra note 98, at 1879-80.
162 Preston v. Martin Bregman Prods., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
163 Prosser, supra note 2, at 391-92 ("On the public street, or in any other public place, the
plaintiff has no right to be alone .... Neither is it such an invasion to take his photograph in such a
place, since this amounts to nothing more than making a record.., of a public sight which any one
present would be free to see.") (citation omitted). One exception to this rule was noted by the
Restatement authors in their comments to the public disclosure tort: "Even in a public place,
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are
not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion
upon these matters." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977). This comment was
based on Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964), see infra note 170, which
remains one of the few examples of a plaintiff who recovered for an invasion of privacy in public.
McClurg, supra note 5, at 1045-46.
164 McClurg, supra note 5, at 999-1006.
165 Id. at 990.
166 Prosser, supra note 2, at 391-92; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c
(1977) ("Complete privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert, and anyone who is not a
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the familiar tort defense of voluntary assumption of risk, whereby if a
plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly puts herself at risk for the harm she
suffers, she cannot recover from the defendant.'67 With regard to privacy
invasions in public, assumption of risk is related to implicit consent 6
because when a jury finds that a plaintiff assumes the risk of having her
privacy invaded by others when she goes into a public space, it is
essentially saying that reasonable members of the community should
perceive or be aware of that risk in public. 69 Even with these policy
concerns as a backdrop, some victims of public invasion of privacy have
been able to lodge successful claims,'7° but the general rule that a person's
mere presence in public is equivalent to consenting to surveillance goes a
long way towards precluding the Street View plaintiff s success.
When applied to the circumstances of the putative Street View
plaintiff, the public-presence-as-consent-to-surveillance rule will likely
be fatal to any claim under the torts of privacy. Take, for example, the
woman caught entering the HIV testing facility. 7 ' First, the fact that the
woman was in a public place when she was photographed means she has
almost zero chance of recovery.'72 This is due to the judicial enforcement
of society's purported view that it is unreasonable to expect privacy in
hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part.")
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
167 David G. Owen, Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C. L. REV. 1, 24
(2000) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1569 (7th ed. 1999) ("The underlying idea of the
assumption of risk defense is that a user has fully consented to incur a risk which the user fully
comprehends. By the act of incurring the risk, the user thus implicitly agrees to take responsibility
for any harmful consequences that may result from the encounter and so relieves the person who
created the risk from responsibility."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 68, at 480 (5th ed. 1984)).
168 McClurg, supra note 5, at 1038-39 (regarding the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS'
definition of assumption of risk, "assumption of risk is grounded in the notion of consent").
169 Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 496 (regarding plaintiff who successfully sued
journalist for invasion of privacy who published a picture of her taken at a funhouse with her skirt
blown up over her head by an air jet and noting that "[s]he should not have been entitled to such an
expectation [of privacy], if she had known or reasonably should have known about the... air jet in
advance of entering the funhouse" and that the plaintiff "would have assumed the risk of exposure");
Helms, supra note 12, at 310 (with respect to each privacy tort but misappropriation, "[i]t is clear
that if a person is aware of or can foresee [the invasion of privacy], a court will deem [the]
disclosure of such information voluntary" and non-actionable) (emphases added); McClurg, supra
note 5, at 1036-37 ("Underlying the rule that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in public
places is the idea that persons effectively assume the risk of scrutiny when they venture from private
sanctuaries such as dwellings or offices.").
170 See, e.g., Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964) ("Where
the status [a plaintiff] expects to occupy is changed without his volition to a status embarrassing to
an ordinary person of reasonable sensitivity, then he should not be deemed to have forfeited his right
to be protected from an indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right of privacy merely because
misfortune overtakes him in a public place."). Calvert and Brown proffer this argument for a victim
of upskirting who was photographed or videotaped in public: because a person "deliberately" wears
clothing to conceal his or her undergarments, it is implicit that she reasonably expects that the
underwear will be private, so the fact that the voyeurism occurred in public does not mean she
relinquished all her reasonable privacy expectations. Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 557.
171 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
172 See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 5, at 992-95 (collecting and describing cases in which
plaintiffs have failed in attempts to sue for invasions of privacy that occurred in public).
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public because reasonable people know others can observe the plaintiff
when they occupy the same public space as she does.'73 Alternatively,
from the assumption of risk perspective, our plaintiff could be viewed as
having assumed the risk of being photographed because she voluntarily
entered a public space in which she knew or reasonably should have
known she could be seen by others.'74 We might even say that she knows
(or reasonably should know) that she will be videotaped by some sort of
surveillance camera at some point on her journey,'75 and so it would be
unreasonable for her to assume that there would be no cameras present at
her destination. Under either approach, then, the Street View plaintiff's
claim fails under the privacy torts, because they revolve around the
judicially approved, societal expectation of no privacy in public spaces
and allow the plaintiffs consent to surveillance to be inferred from her
presence in public.
The primary critique of the public-presence-as-consent principle
is that it assumes a fiction: that people can really choose whether or not
to enter public spaces in the course of their daily lives.'76 As one legal
scholar has noted, in order to truly avoid "voluntarily" consenting to the
public gaze, a person would have to decline jobs outside the home, cease
shopping outside the home, refrain from seeking medical help outside the
home, teach one's children at home, and otherwise "stay inside with the
blinds drawn."'77 Since the ability to conduct work and shopping from
inside one's home is a relatively recent phenomenon' -Dean Prosser
certainly would not have been able to accomplish these tasks from within
173 See supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
174 The level of actual knowledge of a particular risk a plaintiff must have in order to be
said to have assumed it varies by jurisdiction. Owen, supra note 167, at 26-27. Some courts will not
uphold the defense unless the plaintiff fully understood and appreciated the exact risk at hand, while
others merely require that the plaintiff should have known of the risk. Id. at 26-29 (citing and
disapproving of Bereman v. Burdolski, 460 P.2d 567, 569 (Kan. 1969), which applied a "should
have known" requirement).
175 Werbach, supra note 33, at 2355-56 (describing the increasing presence of
government and privately owned surveillance cameras on public streets); Coleman, supra note 62, at
221 ("We have all seen the video cameras stationed on city street corners and on the highways to
monitor traffic."). The author of this Note has also observed the increasing presence of street
cameras on television and that currently at least one television station in the metropolitan New York
area is entirely devoted to showing live footage from cameras placed near heavy automobile traffic
areas. How these pervasive cameras encroach upon society's expectation of privacy will be
discussed in Part II.B.3.
176 McClurg, supra note 5, at 1040 ("There is nothing 'voluntary' about assuming a
public pose except in the most trivial sense. Merely to survive in society requires that people spend a
considerable amount of their time in places accessible to the public.").
177 Id.
178 Jim Barr Coleman points out the irony that while shopping from home might give a
person protection from the public's gaze, it puts the same person squarely at risk of being
"force[d]... to share personal information with people [he has] never even seen," due to the data
and consumer information-collection programs so widespread among Internet vendors. Coleman,
supra note 62, at 232-33; see also ROSEN, supra note 130, at 163-66 (discussing how direct
marketers and Internet retailers are posing an increasing threat to the security of individuals'
personal information).
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his home in 1960, the year he wrote his article"'-it seems odd that the
legal tradition has latched onto the "public presence as consent to
surveillance" model as firmly as it has. 80 Modem tort law experts also
agree that if a person's "only or best 'choice' is to encounter a known
risk .... the encounter is not 'voluntary."""' Yet in any case, it seems clear
that as long as courts and the law adhere to this principle, the Street View
plaintiff will not be able to state a viable claim for invasion of privacy
under the torts.
The second main objection to the public-presence-as-consent-to-
surveillance model is that it obscures the fact that more than the taking of
a photograph is at issue for the Street View plaintiff. In order for it to
function as it does, Google must also compile the images into panoramic
views, link the images to its digital map platform (so that when a user
enters an address into Google Maps, the accompanying Street View
image is also brought up), and then publish the composite Street View
scenes (enabled with browsing and zooming capabilities) onto the
Internet. 1"2 Is it really fair for tort law to assume that a person consents to
all this and more merely by leaving her home? Many commentators are
now answering this question with a resounding no.'83 Whether judges
ever undertake a more precise investigation into exactly what a plaintiff
purportedly consents to by entering a public space will likely depend on
the evolution of society's expectations, since, as discussed below,
society's expectations supposedly gave rise to this rule in the first place.
179 See Prosser, supra note 2, at 394.
180 Professor McClurg suggests that a kind of class separatism may be behind the legal
machine's acceptance of the public-presence-as-consent model, in that wealthier people are often
able to buy themselves physical privacy that poorer people (what to say of homeless people) could
never acquire. McClurg, supra note 5, at 1040.
181 Owen, supra note 167, at 31; accord Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use,
Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 127 (1972) (discussing
illusory nature of an employee's "consent" to being forced to work a dangerous factory machine at
his job). It might be argued that, at least for some of the acts captured by Street View, such as those
depicting socially undesirable acts like not cleaning up after your dog on the subway, the people
photographed assumed some risk that acquaintances could discover their transgressive behavior,
despite the expectation that only uninterested strangers might see. Our sympathies, therefore, for
those people might be justifiably weaker than for people who did no "wrong," yet were subject to
excessive scrutiny and harassment (like Alison Stokke, discussed supra in notes 82-86). This Note
contends that, at least for the ostensibly blameless victim of Internet harassment, the public-
presence-as-consent model should be inapplicable. Additionally, for people whose undesirable
actions are caught on camera, notions of proportionality should still inform the limits of cyber
punishment. See supra note 79.
182 The mechanics of Street View are discussed in Part I.A. Calvert and Brown similarly
identify the separate, successive acts that are inherent in the video voyeur's taping of a victim in
public. Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 488.
183 See, e.g., id. at 495-96; Crisci, supra note 4, at 210 (objecting to implied consent to
photography via presence in public even when the photographed subject is a well-known celebrity);
Keck, supra note 6, at 108-11 (pointing out that consumers have no ability to consent to cyber-
surveillance because they cannot control the bargaining terms); McClurg, supra note 5, at 1040-41;
Siprut, supra note 5, at 312-13.
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3. The "Highly Offensive" Requirement and the Reasonable
Person
Another aspect of the first three privacy torts (intrusion, public
disclosure, and false light) that affects the Street View plaintiff's chance
for recovery is the "highly offensive" requirement.' The tort of
intrusion, for example, requires that the manner of intrusion be highly
offensive to a reasonable person in order for the defendant's conduct to
be actionable.185 With respect to the tort of public disclosure of private
facts, the information actually disclosed must be highly offensive to state
a claim."6 While not applicable to the Street View plaintiff,"7 the false
light tort requires that the "false light in which the [plaintiff] was
placed.. . be highly offensive to a reasonable person."'88 Accordingly, a
Street View plaintiff suing for intrusion would need to show that the manner
of Street View's intrusion was highly offensive and, if suing under public
disclosure, would need to show that the Street View image itself is
highly offensive.
An inquiry into whether the manner in which Street View
collects its images is highly offensive to a reasonable person necessarily
entails an examination of "the prevailing social practices ... relevant to
the expectation of privacy under the circumstances."'8 9 An instructive
example of this principle in action is Shulman v. Group W Productions,
Inc."9° The plaintiffs in that case sued for intrusion upon seclusion when a
production company disseminated film footage showing one of the
plaintiffs being rescued and transported by a helicopter crew after a
devastating car accident.' 9' To evaluate the offensiveness of the
production company's intrusion (by filming the plaintiff at the accident
scene and inside the helicopter), "[t]he court considered the implications
of established custom and norms" in then-current "media practices. "192
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff could not have had a
reasonable expectation that she would not be filmed at the accident
184 Spencer, supra note 121, at 853 (explaining that the torts of intrusion and public
disclosure "are not actionable unless the intrusion 'would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person"') (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)). The fourth tort,
misappropriation, does not contain a "highly offensive" requirement of any kind. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977) ("One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.").
185 Helms, supra note 12, at 310; Keck, supra note 6, at 106.
186 Helms, supra note 12, at 310.
187 The reason for this tort's inapplicability is discussed supra, Part I.B. I.
188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977) (emphasis added).
189 Spencer, supra note 121, at 854.
190 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
191 Id. at 475-76. The plaintiffs also successfully sued for disclosure of public facts based
on the release of an audiotape of the plaintiff conversing with a nurse in the helicopter, id. at 477, but
since audio recordings constitute an entirely different category of information (and form of
intrusion), this Note will address only the elements of the plaintiffs' claims that relate to the putative
Street View plaintiff.
192 Spencer, supra note 121, at 854-55.
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scene, because it was customary for media personnel to congregate at
and film accident locations.193 However, because it was not customary for
reporters to actually accompany victims while en route to the hospital,
the court found that this portion of the defendant's act was indeed an
intrusion upon seclusion. 194
The Shulman court's analysis of the highly offensive
requirement is problematic because it allows the media to define what is
not a highly offensive means of intrusion by simply employing the
contested technique on a regular basis.1 95 It suggests that when society
becomes sufficiently accustomed to a certain surveillance practice, its
presence and eventual practice become so ingrained in the social fabric
that any "reasonable" person is precluded from finding it highly
offensive. Under this approach, the highly offensive requirement is
tautologically linked to the reasonable person standard by analytic
necessity: to decide whether intrusive conduct is highly offensive, the
courts look to what a reasonable person would perceive as highly
offensive. And to decide what a reasonable person would perceive as
offensive, the courts appear to ask whether she would tolerate the
conduct at issue. This "encroachment" cycle becomes internalized by its
subjects and repeated over time until society "lose[s] any sense that
privacy was once possible in the encroached upon area."'196 This is not to
say that the Shulman court's approach does not have any advantages. For
example, it takes the court out of the business of adjudicating the
normative content of the highly offensive requirement in the intrusion
tort; if it did not rely on current practices as the benchmark, the court
might end up having to ask the legislature what it meant by "highly
offensive" manner of intrusion when it codified the intrusion tort.
Nevertheless, one compelling reason for objecting to the
encroachment process in the context of privacy is that it contravenes the
purpose of the legal norm underlying the reasonable person standard,
which the Restatement injected into all the privacy torts except for
misappropriation.1 97 The reasonable person, of course, is "an abstraction,
a representative of the normal standard of community behavior."' 9' Its
function is to protect what Robert Post calls "civility rules," the rules of
"deference and demeanor" that guide and shape personal interaction in
193 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490; see also Spencer, supra note 121, at 854-56.
194 Shulman, 955 P.2d at 490-91; see also Spencer, supra note 121, at 855-56.
195 This kind of circuitous reasoning will be familiar to anyone with knowledge of the
"newsworthiness" standard (as a defense in tort or to government censorship), described infra Part
I.B.
196 Spencer, supra note 121, at 844.
197 Regarding intrusion upon seclusion, liability only attaches "if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). In the
public disclosure tort, one is only liable for disclosure of a matter that would be "highly offensive to
a reasonable person." Id. § 652D. Similarly, to be liable under the false light tort, the light in which
the plaintiff is cast must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id. § 652E.
198 Post, supra note 124, at 961 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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society.' 99 The reasonable person standard accomplishes this by allowing
recovery only for injuries that would be highly offensive to an idealized
member of society who fully obeys all the relevant civility rules, not for
the actual injuries to people who either perceive the conduct at hand to
be too serious (the eggshell plaintiff) or not serious enough to constitute
a social violation (the unusual exhibitionist).2 ' Accordingly, when
applied to the privacy torts, the reasonable person standard (against
which the offensiveness of the defendant's conduct is measured) should
function as a reminder of what conduct should be deemed offensive and
not, as the Shulman court indicated, whether the conduct is deemed
routine by its perpetrators. Thus, the Shulman case demonstrates the
central problem with how the highly offensive requirement has been
applied by courts to claims of invasion of privacy and how it dovetails
with the encroachment process.
With respect to the putative Street View plaintiff suing for
intrusion, if the court follows the Shulman approach to deciding what a
highly offensive manner of intrusion is, it will look at the prevailing
customs of the intruding media as evidence of society's acceptance of
that kind of intrusion. Because Google is the defendant, the relevant
information-collecting practices might be defined by the community of
other Internet map providers or search engines. As noted earlier,
Google's Street View application is not the only one of its kind.2 °t
Amazon used similar filming and web distributing technology in its A9
service,2 °2 and Microsoft and smaller companies like Everyscape2 3
currently provide competitive equivalents to Street View. Therefore, the
court would likely infer that because nowadays Internet companies
commonly film street faqades and link them to their online map
platforms, society has accepted this manner of information-collection,
and it cannot be deemed highly offensive to a reasonable person. 4 A
significant unresolved problem with this inference is that many such
"societal" shifts in acceptance are really performed by a host of disparate
private actors for whom social benefit is but a minor concern and should
not be given such prophetic weight by courts.2 5 Moreover, given the
199 Id. at 963.
200 See id. at 963-64.
201 See supra Part I.A.
202 Id.
203 See Everyscape.com, http://everyscape.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2008), for an
introductory demonstration of this service.
Microsoft may actually soon get off the Internet street fagade bandwagon. The
company has test versions of "street-level technology" in operation for the cities of Seattle and San
Francisco, but it has delayed unveiling the application to the public because it is "looking at ways to
obscure identifiable images like faces and license plates" to avoid some of the backlash Google has
received. Mills, supra note 41.
205 As Shaun B. Spencer observes,
[the] expectation-driven conception of privacy is vulnerable to encroachment. Actors and
groups powerful enough to influence social behavior can change society's expectation of
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increasing familiarity in society (especially among younger generations)
with having one's image and personality defined in part by Internet
206participation, a court (or jury) would likely view being caught by Street
View in an embarrassing situation as part and parcel of living in a
heavily networked modem world.20 7 In sum, the Street View plaintiff has
very little chance of bringing a successful intrusion claim due to
incremental encroachment upon social expectations of privacy and due to
courts' aversion to using a normatively strong reasonable person
standard to counter that encroachment.0 8
4. Problems with Damages
As in all tort actions, the putative Street View plaintiff must
allege legally cognizable damages that flow from the injury to which he
has been subjected. The form of these damages may be nominal or
presumed (i.e., an extremely small amount),0 9 they may be "special"
(damages that would not reasonably be expected to accompany the
injury), they may be commercial and monetizable, they may be punitive,
or they may be emotional damages that compensate for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 20 Alternatively, the plaintiff may also opt
to request equitable or injunctive relief to stop the defendant from
continuing the conduct that is the basis of the lawsuit, which in fact is
actually the current trend in Internet-related tort claims.2 1 However, even
if a plaintiff can show legally cognizable damages, a court will not
impose liability unless the defendant had a duty of care to the plaintiff
that, through his breach, caused the plaintiffs foreseeable injuries (that
are the source of the damages).2t 2 Furthermore, whether a duty of care
privacy, and thereby change what the law will protect as private. They do so by changing
their own conduct or practices, by changing or designing technology to affect privacy, or
by implementing laws that affect society's expectation of privacy.
Spencer, supra note 121, at 860.
20f See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
207 See Werbach, supra note 33, at 2323 (describing the increasing ubiquitousness of
networked sensors in everyday modem life); accord Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and
Computers: The First Amendment and Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REv. 1, 2 (2007)
("Technologies of surveillance continue to proliferate. What one does and says in public places is
increasingly subject to surveillance by means of a combination of [private actors] and official
surveillance tools ... ").
208 Professor McClurg noted a related judicial trend when he discovered that 73% of state
privacy cases and 72% of federal cases were thrown out by judges before ever reaching a jury.
McClurg, supra note 5, at 1000-01. This observation is troubling given the centrality of the
reasonable person standard in privacy claims, because "objective reasonable person tests are usually
for the fact finder to apply and resolve." Id. at 1005. Thus, it may also be the case that in addition to
eschewing the responsibility to identify the privacy norms society wants to preserve in the
reasonable person standard, judges are also preventing those norms from being substantiated by
juries through verdicts and awards.
209 See Post, supra note 124, at 965-66.
210 Coleman, supra note 62, at 216-20; see also Prosser, supra note 2, at 409.
211 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 73, at 101.
212 Id. at 132-33.
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exists, whether a breach occurred, and whether that breach foreseeably
caused the plaintiffs injuries, will be judged from the "reasonable
person" perspective discussed above.213
Dean Prosser noted in his famous article that there is "general
agreement" that a court may award damages for the "presumed mental
distress inflicted" by invasions of privacy, even "without proof' of the
plaintiffs actual harm.214 The Restatement (Second) of Torts concurs
with Dean Prosser, and provides that
[o]ne who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is
entitled to recover damages for (a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting
from the invasion; (b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered... ; and
(c) special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause.
215
Despite these two persuasive authorities, however, courts remain wary of
awarding damages for a plaintiffs unproven harm "to his interest in
privacy." One commentator theorizes that the lack of reported cases in
which courts have awarded damages (even nominal amounts) to
plaintiffs who have not alleged actual harm by the defendant indicates
that "as a practical matter virtually every plaintiff will . . . be able to
produce some credible evidence of . . . actual injury in the form of
emotional suffering. 21 6 This optimistic analysis, however, is not borne
out by caselaw, which hints that, to the contrary, courts do not approve of
plaintiffs who do not allege more concrete forms of damages, such as
commercial loss from misappropriation or contingent special damages.217
Some cases even demonstrate an active judicial hostility towards the
more amorphous damages that Dean Prosser and the Restatement
envisioned. 218  Thus, the Street View plaintiff alleging only vague
damages related to the harm to her privacy interest will likely find courts
213 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
214 Prosser, supra note 2, at 409.
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977).
216 Post, supra note 124, at 965-66.
217 For example, in a case where an employer videotaped its employees during a hearing
in which the employees contested the recent denial of promotions to them, the court "stopped just
short of openly ridiculing" the employees when they described the psychological harm the
videotaping had caused them. McClurg, supra note 5, at 1006-07 (discussing Albright v. United
States, 732 F.2d 181, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). The plaintiffs described their respective harms from the
forced videotaping as analogous to living in an oppressive totalitarian state, as feeling the same
vulnerability as one might after a home invasion, and as feeling like a "nonentity .... that things
could be done to me without my knowledge, approval, or say." Albright, 732 F.2d at 187. The court,
however, scoffed at their testimony (which it found so exaggerated as to render the entire case
unbelievable), and even suggested that if the plaintiffs had truly been so offended, they should have
left the employment hearing. Id.
21 See, e.g., Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983). In
Jackson, see supra note 153, the court refused to make a common sense finding that the plaintiffs
had been "exposed to public contempt and ridicule" by their unwitting appearance in the country's
most popular pornographic magazine. Id. The court also discredited the plaintiffs' allegation that
they were "humiliated, annoyed, [and] disgraced" by the publication because of defective pleading.
Id. Of course, it was within the court's discretion to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
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inhospitable to her claims, even if some or most people would intuitively
think she had indeed suffered psychological distress and harm.
219
It might be argued, of course, that by setting up high barriers
regarding damages for plaintiffs using the privacy torts, judges are
merely serving their traditional gatekeeper function to weed out frivolous
claims that would otherwise overwhelm the legal system.220 However,
several rationales exist that support Dean Prosser's and the
Restatement's version of more amorphous damages. The first rationale is
that unless the plaintiff is a celebrity or has suffered a significant
commercial loss because of the defendant's invasion of privacy, the
amount of damages involved in a privacy case is likely to be very small 221
and hence provides little incentive for frivolous plaintiffs to sue.
Therefore, by imposing further obstacles in addition to the cost of
litigation on a plaintiff, courts are artificially shrinking the pool of
potential plaintiffs to those who have commercial damages, even though
the "mushrooming number" of people being victimized through the
Internet is well-recorded.222 The second rationale is that judges do not
appear to "get it" in privacy cases when it comes to appreciating the
depths of plaintiffs' mental distress resulting from unwanted
dissemination of a photograph, 223 and this institutional incompetence is
especially pronounced in cases involving the effects of technology and
the Internet upon citizens.224 Thus, plaintiffs may be prejudiced by
judges' generally low level of understanding regarding the Internet's
intricacies and common practices (such as "flaming" 22 ) and injuries that
should be compensated are not. Accordingly, the more stringent damages
standards used by judges are not desirable in many cases and should be
informed by the more flexible Restatement standard described above.226
Damages are also a problem for the would-be Street View
plaintiff attempting to sue under the misappropriation tort. 2 27
219 For example, if the woman who was caught entering the H1V testing facility were to
discover that this photo has been disseminated and discussed so widely (which she may already
have), see supra note 60 and accompanying text, most people would agree that having the whole
world comment upon one's choice to be tested for HIV is psychologically distressing and a terrible
ordeal.
220 Professor McClurg suggests judges do this partly in order "to exert jury control over a
tort that has been criticized as having no 'legal profile,"' and partly to protect the free speech issues
that often arise in invasion of privacy cases. McClurg, supra note 5, at 1006 (citing Harry Kalven Jr.,
Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327
(1966)).
221 Note, supra note 98, at 1878-81.
222 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 73, at 87-88.
223 See McClurg, supra note 5, at 1006; see also supra notes 216-217 and
accompan1ing text.
See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 73, at 132-33.
225 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 212-218.
227 There are several other doctrinal obstacles relating specifically to misappropriation.
For example, the doctrine of incidental use renders "fleeting" use of a likeness non-actionable.
Preston v. Martin Bregman Prods. Inc., 765 F. Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Nonetheless, for
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Interestingly, while this tort has been unhelpful to victims of other kinds
of Internet information privacy violations (such as the sale of a mailing
list or consumer profile), 2 ' at first glance the Street View plaintiff does
seem to have a much stronger chance of prevailing under it. Street View
is made up entirely of images, which fit squarely inside the statutory
definition of the plaintiffs "likeness" that the tort is designed to
protect.29  While the "benefit" Street View gains23°  from using
individuals' pictures appears to be advertising revenue, recovery based
on the value of the defendant's use of the contested image is generally
restricted to celebrity plaintiffs.23" ' Non-celebrity plaintiffs "typically seek
damages based on the emotional harm that use of [their] image has cost
[them], 232 even though, as discussed earlier, courts have not been
particularly receptive to their emotional harms.233  Courts may also
require the Street View plaintiff to show that his image had an intrinsic
value from which the accused wrongdoer intended to profit.234 Therefore,
the non-celebrity Street View plaintiff who cannot monetize his image's
prior value in his complaint, or who cannot convince a judge that he
suffered some actual emotional harm, will likely fail in his cause of
action under misappropriation.
5. Google's Newsworthy Defense
As many would-be plaintiffs have found, complaints based on
the torts of privacy must overcome defenses and traditional privileges
afforded to members of the media, which arise out of the First
purposes of focus, this Note will only discuss the damages issue. The viability of a newsworthy
defense to misappropriation is explored infra Part I.B.
228 Lin, supra note 3, at 1109, 1111. This is because mailing lists or consumer profiles
contain information about various aspects of a person's personality (perhaps in addition to the
person's name), which do not necessarily come within the statutory meaning of "identity"
(interpreted as a name) or "likeness" (interpreted as an image). Id.
229 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). Some commentators suggest,
however, that if a non-celebrity's image appears "on a for-profit, commercial site on the World Wide
Web," the commercial appropriation tort could obtain, since the commercial gain element can be
proven through revenues from advertising. See Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 562; see also
CATE, supra note 154, at 89. However, this argument would certainly fail in states like New York,
where courts have held that "the presence of advertising matter" in or near the allegedly-
misappropriated image does not automatically mean the defendant has used the plaintiffs likeness
for a commercial purpose. Prosser, supra note 2, at 405.
230 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977).
231 See Siprut, supra note 5, at 320; Lin, supra note 3, at 111.
232 Siprut, supra note 5, at 320.
233 See supra notes 216-217 and accompanying text. The Tenth Circuit has indicated its
rejection of the "emotional side to misappropriation," preferring instead to allow recovery under the
tort only when financial losses have been sustained by the plaintiff. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Note, supra note 98, at
1883 n.84.
234 Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983) ("[In order to
state a cause of action for invasion of privacy by appropriation, the complaint must allege that
plaintiff's name or likeness has some intrinsic value, which was taken by defendant for its own
benefit, commercial or otherwise.").
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Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press.235 Specifically, "[t]here is
no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to
information about the plaintiff that is already public," or when the
defendant publicizes "what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public
eye." '236 Thus, Google may also be able to claim First Amendment
protection (also known as the newsworthy defense) for Street View
because it is a commercial actor engaged in the "gathering of images"
and speech equivalents. 37 If successful, such a defense would provide a
complete bar to Google's liability under the public disclosure and
misappropriations torts.238
A threshold issue in this area is whether Google can be included
with the more traditional newsgatherers as part of the "press" that the
Framers contemplated would be protected by the First Amendment's
umbrella.239 One indication that Google would be considered a member
of the press is that its services disseminate news 40 Since the Supreme
Court has held that there is no particular inherent quality in information
to qualify it for First Amendment protection, it seems fair to assume
Google would be treated as a newsgatherer for these purposes.24
To formulate its newsworthy defense to the Street View
plaintiffs claim of public disclosure or misappropriation, Google would
need to show that Street View publishes content that is "lawfully
obtained and of some interest to the public."242  This so-called
newsworthiness standard is a notoriously loose one, with "the vast
majority of cases seem[ing] to hold that what is printed is by definition
of legitimate public interest."243 Diana Zimmerman describes these
235 Prosser, supra note 2, at 410 (describing the two special rights of the press to give
"further publicity to already public figures" and to give "publicity to news, and other matters of
public interest"). The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
236 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).237 Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 505.
238 Because the intrusion upon seclusion has no publicity component, a defense of
newsworthiness (which is to say publicity was warranted) is inapplicable. Newsworthiness does,
however, provide a defendant with a solid shield under the false light tort, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652E cmt. c (1977), but because that tort does not apply to the Street View plaintiff, see
supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text, it will not be addressed here.
239 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (affirming importance of free speech
and press to country's welfare and noting that "without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated"). For a more detailed discussion of the legal ramifications
of dubbing Internet providers or web blog posters "members of the press," see Zick, supra note 207,
at 42-45.
240 See, e.g., http://news.google.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2008).
241 As Justice Thomas commented in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, "First
Amendment protection was extended to that fundamental category of artistic and entertaining speech
not for its own sake, but only because it was indistinguishable, practically, from speech intended to
inform." 540 U.S. 93, 282 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242 Zick, supra note 207, at 45 (citing Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)).
243 Diana L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 353 (1983). This standard was at work in the
Shulman case, see supra notes 190-194 and accompanying text. In that case, the newsworthiness of
the plaintiff's accident in conjunction with the court's approval of the media's method of
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outcomes as illustrating courts' preferred "[1]eave-it-to-the-[p]ress
[m]odel," in which courts allow the media to determine what is
newsworthy through its choice to publish a particular item.2' Thus, even
though very few (if any) images available on Street View possess
newsworthy or informational qualities, Google will likely be able to
argue that its images are "[n]on-obscene photographs [which] are a form
of speech protected by the First Amendment."245
Moreover, while the ostensibly commercial nature of Street
View might give a plaintiff a foothold under the misappropriation tort,24
6
"[t]he fact that speech is sold for a profit or that it is used for
entertainment does not mean that its distribution is unprotected by the
Constitution."247 Therefore, courts are not likely to locate restraints on
Street View's gathering or disseminating of online photos under the First
Amendment due to the defense of newsworthiness.
In sum, the putative Street View plaintiff has little chance of
prevailing under the privacy torts as they are currently interpreted by the
legal system. The inherent obstacles to her recovery, such as the public-
presence-as-consent doctrine and the highly offensive requirement, could
become more pliant if judges discard the circular reasoning underlying
them and become more alert to guarding against encroachment in privacy
protection. Further, the judiciary's customary hostility to the more
amorphous damages sustained by plaintiffs whose privacy was invaded
in public is dismissive of the social and emotional consequences that can
follow such a violation. Additionally, as long as Google can employ the
leave-it-to-the-press model of the newsworthy defense with impunity,
any Street View complainant will likely fail on that point as well.
Therefore, until scholars, judges, and legislatures begin to wade through
the thick doctrinal hedges surrounding Internet privacy violations,
Google (or companies engaged in similar activities) will likely emerge
unscathed from litigation and thus unmotivated to become more
responsive to privacy concerns.248
information-collection was a central reason the court found for the defendant on the intrusion
relating to the videotaping of the plaintiff at the scene of her accident See supra notes 189-194 and
accompanying text.
244 Zimmerman, supra note 243, at 353. This of course is very similar to the courts'
analysis of the highly offensive requirement in intrusion cases. See supra notes 184-189 and
accompay~i~ng text.
Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 504 n.200 ("As with pictures, films, paintings,
drawings, and engravings, both oral utterances and the printed word have First Amendment
protection until they collide with the long-settled position of this Court that obscenity is not
protected by the Constitution.") (citing Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973)).
See supra text accompanying notes 157-162 for a discussion on misappropriation.
247 Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 508.
248 As noted by the attorney for the Boring couple, who started the first suit against Street
View in the United States, discussed supra note 116, Google's reliance on its removal procedures
belies its desire to not have "any accountability. What's to motivate them to change and put in better
internal controls?" Elinson, supra note 116.
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LI. How PRIVACY PROTECTION SHOULD EVOLVE IN LIGHT OF
STREET VIEW
This Note has argued thus far in Part I that while people are
more comfortable than ever with being surveyed by private actors and
living much of their lives online, they are nevertheless increasingly
concerned with their online image management.249 In Part II, this Note
explored the contours of a hypothetical claim against Street View under
the privacy torts and concluded that as privacy law stands now, the
putative Street View plaintiff is destined to fail.25° However, because
several key features of privacy law are dependent on societal
expectations, it is quite possible that at some point soon, concepts like
online image management and alternative damage theories will rise to
prominence and can provide the would-be Street View plaintiff a viable
legal platform. This Section begins by arguing that online image
management should be recognized in the legal community as the essence
of a new privacy, in which people are comfortable with private
surveillance but can still expect a modicum of control in determining the
distribution and extent of that surveillance. The Section will then suggest
several tort reforms and non-legal solutions that would recalibrate the
balance between our formal and physical means of protecting privacy in
modem America.
A. What Are We Trying to Protect in the First Place?
The meaning of "privacy" has long been a subject of controversy
and disagreement."' There does seem to be a small consensus, however,
around Ruth Gavison's articulation of solitude, secrecy, and anonymity
as privacy's essential components.252 Online image management, the
concern for an individual's ability to define one's image (both pictorial
and reputational) on the Internet, should be included in any modern
enunciation of what people look to protect when they assert their right to
privacy. Concomitantly, online image management should also concern
the potential for others to manipulate or interfere with one's online
image. Accordingly, Street View's arrival in the Internet community and
its potential for defining individuals' online images bring the need for
explicit recognition of these concerns into sharp relief.
One significant reason why online image management should be
explicitly recognized as a component of legally protected privacy is that
249 See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
250 See supra Part 11.
251 See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
252 Gavison, supra note 110, at 428; McClurg, supra note 5, at 1029-36 (using Gavison's
articulation as basis for analyzing hypothetical illustrating the loss of privacy that can occur in a
public place); Coleman, supra note 62, at 225-26 (describing McClurg's acceptance of Gavison's
theory in his work).
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Street View and other similar Internet applications are fundamentally
different from the more traditional methods of information-collection
that can threaten privacy. This insight should be emphasized, especially
with respect to the Internet's power to provide any user with the ability
to reproduce, store, and distribute a photograph without the logistical or
pecuniary restraints that once were in place.53 The gravitas of online
image and reputation management is already recognized by employers,
landlords, admissions offices of educational institutions, students and
youth culture in general, and of course members of the online reputation
management industry.5 Further, the fact that the public relations
industry has already recognized its importance is a compelling indication
that this concept will only become more crucial as Internet access
continues to spread across the globe.255
Another noteworthy reason why online image management is a
desirable addition to the pantheon of privacy rights is that it provides a
more accurate understanding of the harms that people actually
experience when their online image integrity is compromised. As one
commentator notes, unauthorized use of another's image impedes that
person's ability to control the way she presents herself to society.256 The
essence of this harm "is an impingement on the victim's freedom in the
authorship of her self-narrative, not merely her loss of profits."257
Another problem exacerbated by an online photo is that it allows the
viewer to fit the subject into one of several discursive categories ("X is a
homosexual and/or a diseased person"25 for entering that HIV-testing
facility) and encourages speculation that further damages the individual's
ability to control her identity.259
The utility of this principle is clear when applied to the Jackson
v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. case, in which the judge refused to accept
that the plaintiffs were "exposed to public contempt and ridicule" by
their nonconsensual appearance in the country's most popular
pornographic magazine.2" Pretending for a moment that this case arose
during the Internet era, it is much more likely that if the judge had
understood the nuances of online image management and how the
253 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 62, at 221; Fishman, supra note 3, at 1511 ("Until
recently . . .. the means to disseminate information beyond a fairly small community were
limited .... Today, the Internet has obliterated those restraints.").
25 See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
255 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Additionally, there is no reason to assume
that uses for others' online images will be strictly benign; it is certainly possible that Street View and
technologies like it could be used by stalkers or burglars, and thus online image management could
impact safety concerns as well.
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 548 (2006).
257 Id. at 549.
258 Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 427 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
259 Id.
260 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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plaintiffs' lives were inexorably altered by the publication of the
contested photograph, he would have been more receptive to the
plaintiffs' allegations of emotional harm.
Moreover, when truthful information that affects a person's
status in a community is disseminated without that person's consent, the
law should recognize the victim's loss of respect and dignity.26' Many
people who were children or teenagers during the Internet revolution's
infancy will find that many of their less noble moments will be preserved
forever. It is no exaggeration to suggest that "[t]his phenomenon creates
the risk that individuals will be judged solely on the basis of their
moments of weakness, thus erasing a lifetime of good." '262 In fact, the
existence of the online image management service providers is a signal
that this eventuality has already come to pass.
Therefore, online image management is an aspect of privacy that
deserves legal protection. The general trend among judges to disregard
the impact of unwarranted manipulation of a person's online image (or
printed image, for that matter) increasingly contradicts the emerging
social importance that online image management carries.263 Additionally,
by supporting the implementation of online image management as a
proper privacy concern, legal actors can continue to fine-tune existing
tort law to the needs and particularities of the Internet surveillance and
information-collection technologies of the future. However, if online
image management is ever actually recognized, it will affect certain
aspects of the privacy tort doctrine in ways beneficial to the putative
Street View plaintiff.
B. How the Fonnal/Physical Balance Can Be Regained
The first area of likely tort reform in response to the recognition
of online image management is the general rule that privacy invasions
cannot take place in public."4 This public-presence-as-consent model is
premised upon the notion that people consent to a certain amount of
surveillance by others when they enter the public sphere.265 Yet if online
image management was a pervasive concept, the fact that an image-
subject was captured in public would be inconsequential because courts
would understand that the photography that occurred in public is but one
element of the violation as a whole. That Internet images are a different
animal from print images would be self-evident from the enhanced
261 Post, supra note 124, at 967-68. The leading case for the recognition of loss of dignity
independently of financial loss resulting from the invasion of privacy in public is Daily Times
Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). See supra note 170.
262 Note, supra note 98, at 1881.
263 This is especially true given the widespread use of scanners that convert any printed
image or text into digital information that can be searched and stored. See id. at 1871-72.
264 See supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text.
265 See supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
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reproductive, storing, and disseminating capabilities that the Internet
provides. Therefore, judges would be able to draw more accurate lines
along the gradations of consent that appear in populations who might
voluntarily pose for a photo in public but would object to that photograph
being posted on a public web site.
The next area of tort reform would likely occur in how judges
interpret the highly offensive requirement, which is so crucial to
recovery under certain privacy torts.266 Currently, courts look to
prevailing media practices to determine if a method of information-
collection is highly offensive.267 However, the acknowledgement of
online image management's significance would encourage courts to enter
the normative debate about what type of media intrusion is likely to
interfere with an individual's ability to self-determine his online profile.
For example, the unwanted Internet attention received by Alison
Stokke266 would not be judged by the fact that media personnel routinely
post pictures to blogs that often become the subject of derisive
commentary. Instead, a court could ask whether the nonconsensual
posting of Stokke's image on the Internet is likely to detract from her
ability to present herself to our larger society in the way she chooses. Not
only is this the more precise formulation of the issue for victims like
Stokke and "Dog Poop Girl," it also would provide a firm incentive for
Street View and other similar services to self-police their web sites for
content that would interfere with subjects' authorship of their online
profiles.269
The problems that the putative Street View plaintiff faces
regarding damages would also be eased by the legal community's formal
recognition of online image management. As discussed above, the
victims of privacy invasions akin to the putative Street View plaintiff
have encountered both outright hostility and scorn from the judiciary
when attempting to articulate the emotional harms they experienced.27°
Yet it also appears that the privacy torts, as first conceptualized by Dean
Prosser, were designed to address exactly those emotional harms, even
without particularized proof.27 Online image management would give
judges a more definitive framework from which to evaluate plaintiffs'
emotional harms because they can hear testimony from Internet users,
review web site popularity indicators, and conduct their own Internet
searches to gage the extent to which a defendant has wrongly interfered
266 See supra Part II.B.3 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 195-196 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
269 Formulating an objective standard for policing images that interfere with an
individual's online image is likely to be a complex and contested process. That being said, this Note
would suggest that certain categories of photographs, such as photographs of people unknowingly
revealing undergarments or bare body parts, seem more likely to gain support for removing.
270 See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text.
271 See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text.
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with a plaintiffs online image management. Further, online image
management can also be judged from the familiar reasonable person
standard (i.e., whether a reasonable person would experience loss of
control of his or her online image profile from the alleged conduct). This
would square nicely with tort law's general goals of providing
predictable incentives to private actors, in the form of presumed or
nominal damages that encourage Google and similar companies to self-
police, and the substantiation of community norms.272
Another benefit regarding the damages problem that online
image management provides is a better opportunity to address the
ignorant plaintiff problem. As scholars have noted with respect to other
kinds of Internet privacy violations, "it is not very likely that a victim
would even discover or learn about the display of her image on the
[Internet]." '273 Thus, it is probably the case that the pool of potential
plaintiffs complaining of Street View or similar applications will be
underinclusive, since whether any particular plaintiff discovers the
interference with her online image management is left to the luck of the
draw. There is little incentive for Google or other Internet companies to
self-edit their content, because the chances of being sued successfully are
quite slim.274 If online image management is implemented as a means of
alleging presumed or statutory damages, however, that incentive becomes
notably stronger because there would be no question whether a person
would have a stake in maintaining the integrity of his or her online image.
The last and perhaps most difficult area of reform could occur
with respect to the newsworthiness doctrine as a defense to the privacy
torts. As explained earlier, the newsworthiness standard is notoriously
loose, with most courts following the deferential leave-it-to-the-press
model when it comes to determining whether published content is
newsworthy.275 While the rarified position the First Amendment occupies
in American law will surely endure,2 76 online image management
provides at the least another counterbalance to the weight courts usually
give to the compulsion to protect media speech. Also, since
newsworthiness does revolve around media practices, if online image
management were recognized by media actors as well, it might very well
lead to changes in industry practice that will in turn affect the
determination of newsworthiness.
Finally, it is also very possible that an explicit recognition by the
legal community of online image management would effect a change in
272 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
273 Calvert & Brown, supra note 4, at 562 (making this point with respect to victims of
video voyeurism and upskirting).
274 See supra note 116 for a discussion of the lone civil lawsuit against Google
Street View.
275 See supra notes 243-244 and accompanying text.
276 See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers
of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1003, 1006-07 (2000).
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market forces for Internet companies like Google. There is already
evidence that this is occurring. Recently, Microsoft (a chief Google
competitor) indicated that it would take more drastic measures to protect
individuals' privacy in its own mapping platform that features some
views of street faqades. 277 The company has test versions of "street-level
technology" in operation for the cities of Seattle and San Francisco, but it
has delayed unveiling the application to the general public because it is
"looking at ways to obscure identifiable images like faces and license
plates" to avoid some of the criticism Google has received.278 Even
Google itself has already signaled its willingness to bow to societal
pressure regarding privacy protection by agreeing to blur faces and
license plates in its European version of Street View. 279 Further, Google
now reports that it is considering doing the same to its domestic version:
[E]ven if it's legal, some may still be uncomfortable with the [Street View]
photographs .... It's sort of that "ick" feeling that something makes you feel
uncomfortable .... [T]his calls into question the whole idea of whether privacy
is something that needs to be regulated by law or if there's this other concept of
privacy that we need to look at ... 280
And indeed, in May of 2008, Google implemented its face-blurring
technology in the streets of Manhattan, New York.28" ' Thus, market
pressure exerted by consumers may encourage Internet companies to
rethink their values and choices regarding consumer privacy.282 Google
might also consider making all Street View images resistant to
downloading by users or could begin self-policing through mandatory
quality checks in order to address consumer concerns.
In sum, the recognition of online image management as a distinct
and valued aspect of legally-protected privacy will affect several areas of
current privacy tort law. The rule that privacy invasions cannot occur in
public and the highly offensive requirement may very well evolve into
more plaintiff-friendly principles that could provide a viable legal
platform for the putative Street View plaintiff. Additionally, online
image management provides a sound theoretical framework that
encompasses the real emotional harms that victims of Internet privacy
277 Mills, supra note 41.
278 Id.
279 McMillan, supra note 13. Additionally, when Google was approached by the director
of an Oregon domestic violence shelter with concerns that Street View might endanger victims of
domestic violence by revealing confidential shelter locations, Google agreed to obscure those images
that could identify the shelters or their residents. Rogoway, supra note 90, at Al.
280 McMillan, supra note 13.
281 Posting of Andrea Frome to Google Lat Long Blog, http://google-
latlong.blogspot.com/2008/05/street-view-revisits-manhattan.html (May 12, 2008 6:00 PM EST).
The efficacy of this technology, however, is already being questioned; the algorithm used to blur
faces is not entirely accurate at this stage. Posting of Steven Shankland to CNET News Blog,
http://news.cnet.comI8301-10784_3-9943140-7.html (May 13, 2008, 10:01 AM PDT).
282 Several Internet applications that search online images to identify requested faces are
actually already available, see, e.g., TinEye.com, http://tineye.com/login (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
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violations often feel but have had difficulty translating into legally-
cognizable terms. Finally, online image management could galvanize the
Internet community to become more responsive to consumer demands for
privacy and control over how they are presented to the world over the Internet.
CONCLUSION
The balance between formal and physical protections of privacy
is not a static one, and new surveillance technology is one of the main
forces that continually tips the scale. But the interdependent relationship
between them remains; if "old" privacy values are left vulnerable by new
technologies, then either society has outgrown the formal assurances that
protected those values, or it must reexamine their content and refine the
formal/physical dichotomy to regain the status quo. Google Street
View's reception in American society as compared with its treatment
under current privacy tort law is an example of this process at work.
Despite criticism from certain corners, Street View's popularity
continues to grow as Internet users discover new applications for the
program and more cities are filmed. However, Street View's spreading
popularity does not mean that Internet users have totally abandoned all
sense of privacy. The nuanced understanding of online privacy
demonstrated by many frequent Internet users and the blooming online
reputation management industry signal that a concern for online image
management should be included among the legal (formal) protections of
privacy as people become more aware of the risks of digital storage,
reproduction, and distribution of online information. On the other hand,
market forces and technological alterations are also available to
supplement the physical protections for online image management.
Regardless of which path we choose, we must commit to vigorous
reevaluation of our privacy values alongside the constantly developing
technology that draw them into question.
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